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BREAKING THE CYCLE: 
COUNTERING VOTER INITIATIVES 
AND THE 
UNDERREPRESENTATION OF 




This Article examines issues of inequality in education, minority 
representation, and access to the political process. The Article considers 
constitutional protections and other legal mechanisms available to racial 
minorities to nullify or circumnavigate majoritarian voter initiatives that 
seek to override federal constitutional guarantees and United States 
Supreme Court holdings on the validity of the use of race in university 
admissions decisions. Voter initiatives have been used to undermine the 
socio-economic and political interests of vulnerable communities. In the 
education realm, affirmative action opponents are increasingly adopting 
this instrument to defeat race-conscious admissions policies. This Article 
focuses on several seminal cases involving the political process doctrine, 
including the Court’s most recent decision, Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action. In Schuette, the Court held that the 
amendment to Michigan’s Constitution, which prohibits governmental 
entities from utilizing race-conscious policies, is valid under the Equal 
Protection Clause. In so holding, the Court failed to adequately address 
the argument that the amendment leaves some minorities without 
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meaningful access to the political process. This Article proposes 
recommendations for ensuring that the rights of minorities are 
adequately represented. 
 
This case is not about how the debate about racial preferences 
is resolved. It is about who may resolve it.1 
 – Justice Anthony Kennedy 
 
Today’s decision eviscerates an important strand of our equal 
protection jurisprudence. For members of historically marginalized 
groups, which rely on the federal courts to protect their 
constitutional rights, the decision can hardly bolster hope for a 
vision of democracy that preserves for all the right to participate 
meaningfully and equally in self-government.2 
 – Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
INTRODUCTION 
Education and voting rights are intricately linked. The ability of 
racial minorities to influence matters of access to education is being 
diluted in two prominent ways. The first is through voter initiatives. A 
voter initiative is a political mechanism through which registered voters 
may organize, obtain a requisite number of signatures on a petition, and 
have that petition certified by the state for consideration by the general 
electorate to change the state’s laws.3 In the education context, voter 
initiatives and referenda have operated: (i) to render ineffectual 
fundamental constitutional guarantees such as the right to vote and 
have one’s vote count, as guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, (ii) to distort legislation such as Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (iii) to circumnavigate court decisions that 
validate constitutional protections and the use of protective strategies 
 
 1.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014).  
 2.  Id. at 1683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 3.  In contrast, the voter referendum typically operates by having “the legislature and 
governor sign a bill into law and then, if enough citizens sign a petition to qualify a referendum, 
the bill is sent to the voters for final approval.” See Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, The 
Populist Legacy: Initiatives and the Undermining of Representative Government, in DANGEROUS 
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 33, 41 (Larry J. Sabato, 
Howard R. Ernst & Bruce Larson, eds., 2001). 
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(e.g. affirmative action) intended to address disparities in education.4 
Anti-affirmative action voter initiatives are operating to disadvantage 
certain minorities precisely in the way that Justice Stone forewarned in 
his famous Carolene Products Footnote Four5 and in ways that John 
Hart Ely expounded upon in Democracy and Distrust, his influential 
work on representative government and political process theory.6 
Political science scholars have documented well the politically 
disarming effects of the voter initiative on racial minority voters.7 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action8 exemplifies the 
profound relationship between education and political participation in 
policy decisions and, therefore, is a focal point of discussion. 
This Article argues that not only should society as a whole be 
concerned about the negative aspects of direct democracy mechanisms 
but also courts, in particular, should be circumspect because their role 
as effective adjudicators is being undermined. Courts are charged with 
the responsibility of engaging in legally grounded and reasoned 
analysis of matters involving the constitutional rights of citizens. 
Abdicating their duties should not be a matter left to their sole 
discretion. Yet this is exactly what is occurring.9 When confronted with 
the opportunity to reassert their authority with respect to cases 
involving the constitutional rights of racial minorities and matters of 
equal education, the United States Supreme Court and some lower 
courts have opted to eschew their responsibilities and anoint the 
electorate, through the direct democracy vehicles of voter initiatives 
and referenda, as the appropriate arbiter of constitutional rights. 
Evidence of this disturbing trend is furnished by cases involving 
plaintiffs who have brought challenges to anti-affirmative action laws.10 
Schuette and the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Coalition for Economic 
 
 4.  Derrick Bell, The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH L. 
REV. 1 (1978); Barbara Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Vote, 1 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 41 (1997).  
 5.  United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
 6.  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (Harv. Univ. Press 1981).  
 7.  See, e.g., Cain & Miller, supra note 3, at 33–62; Bell, supra note 4; Julian N. Eule, Judicial 
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1545 (1990). 
 8.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 9.  See id. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur role as judges includes policing the 
process of self-government and stepping in when necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee 
of equal protection.”).  
 10.  An anti-affirmative action law is one that counters race-conscious legal measures 
designed to address present disparities in various realms (e.g. public education or employment) 
or remediate past discriminatory treatment. 
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Equity v. Wilson and Coalition for Economic Equity v. Brown11 
exemplify this concerning trajectory of jurisprudence. 
Anti-affirmative action cases are another avenue by which the 
voting power of racial minorities in the realm of education is being 
diluted. The impact of these cases is that racial minorities are 
constrained in the contributions they are permitted to make in the 
shaping of laws, policies, and practices that concern their access to 
education and the quality of education they receive. White plaintiffs 
typically initiate these cases involving equal protection challenges to 
race-conscious college admissions policies.12 Problematically styled as 
“reverse discrimination” cases, the plaintiffs assert that the policies 
academic administrators have designed to decrease educational 
disparities violate the Equal Protection Clause. As Reva Siegel has 
astutely argued, the Supreme Court’s review of the anti-affirmative 
action cases as compared to equal protection cases asserting that the 
interests of racial minorities have been harmed demonstrates that 
extraordinary constitutional protection is extended to the former while 
the latter are subjected to the rigors of strict scrutiny and thus, likely to 
be defeated.13 The downfall of race-conscious affirmative action 
measures is that they announce themselves in terms of race.14 Escaping 
that construct has proved to be challenging despite efforts to craft 
substitute schemes that take into account race without expressly stating 
that as a purpose.15 The Court’s approach to both types of cases is a 
perverse application of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI, which 
at their inception were crafted to address racial inequalities 
experienced by certain racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans.16 
 
 11.  See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (facial challenge) 
(holding that section 31 did not violate the equal protection clause). The Ninth Circuit rejected 
the argument that racial classifications were involved, thereby precluding the political structure 
argument, because the face of the amendment prohibited racial discrimination. Id. at 702. See also 
Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (reaffirming previous holding that 
“section 31 under a political-structure equal protection analysis, did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment”).  
 12.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 13.  Reva Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013).  
 14.  To the extent the policies state that they permit admissions committees to consider race, 
this factor is a visible one. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 15.  The percentage plans in Texas and California are examples of alternative approaches.  
 16.  See generally SAMUEL LEITER & WILLIAM LEITER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND POLICY (SUNY Press 2002). 
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While both of the foregoing counter affirmative action strategies 
(i.e. judicial deference to majority rule by initiative and litigation 
attacks on race-conscious policies) present substantial challenges to 
those who are concerned with fulfilling equality education objectives 
for racial minorities who historically have been underrepresented in 
higher education, this Article is primarily concerned with the promise 
of political process theory, the erosive aspects of voter initiatives, and 
how the judicial and legislative branches should deal with direct 
democracy instruments in racial equality in education and voting 
matters. 
The Schuette case connects the anti-affirmative action cases with 
the discourse on equality in public policy decisionmaking. This Article 
argues that when courts are confronted with issues involving the 
education of historically marginalized racial minorities, the final 
determination of those matters should not be left to voters. Relying 
upon direct democracy leaves minorities vulnerable. Their voices will 
be stifled and they will be subject to majoritarian interests that may 
seriously undermine and constrain their socio-economic advancement. 
Various machinations of the majority often work to impair the ability 
of minorities to fully access fundamental resources in society (e.g. 
education) that are necessary for their well-being, development, and 
growth as human beings. Therefore, even when democracy is the 
prevailing political structure and formal equality exists, it is necessary 
to have mechanisms in place that are designed to protect racial 
minorities. The government’s failure to facilitate their flourishing in this 
way limits their potential to make valuable contributions, advance, and 
ultimately impoverishes society as a whole.17 It is necessary to have 
processes and institutions that achieve the goals of participatory 
democracy and that interrogate the quality and impact of formal 
equality. Judicial interrogation should be informed by the history that 
gave rise to the guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments and certain legislative interventions of Congress (e.g. 
Title VI and the Voting Rights Act). 
This Article proceeds in the following manner: Part I situates 
Schuette within the education jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court, discusses the origins of political process theory, 
 
 17.  Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, Separate and Unequal: How Higher Education 
Reinforces the Intergenerational Reproduction of White Racial Privilege, GEORGETOWN 
UNIVERSITY CENTER ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE (July 31, 2013), 
https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/SeparateUnequal.FR_.pdf. 
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provides background on the case, and critiques the Schuette decision. 
In particular, this Article highlights Schuette’s inconsistencies and 
errors regarding the political process theory.18 The Court articulated a 
new but grossly insufficient standard for protecting equal rights, and for 
facilitating their achievement for racial minorities who have been 
historically disenfranchised and prevented from participating fully in 
the benefits and privileges of American society. Moreover, the Court’s 
treatment of political process theory as it pertains to matters of race 
differs markedly from its receptiveness to the theory as it relates to 
other groups, such as gays and lesbians, yet, the Schuette Court offered 
no principled rationale for the inconsistent approaches.19 Part II 
highlights some fundamental problems with voter initiatives that make 
them particularly inappropriate to decide issues involving fundamental 
constitutional guarantees. Part III makes recommendations. Part IV 
concludes the Article. 
I.  SITUATING SCHUETTE 
As an initial matter, it is necessary to situate Schuette in the context 
of education jurisprudence. The importance of Schuette in relation to 
the line of contemporary education legal jurisprudence20 has not been 
adequately appreciated. Schuette squarely fits in this canon. Schuette is 
about the avenues that historically disfavored racial minorities, such as 
African Americans, have available to them to shape the educational 
policies at public schools and to participate in an impactful way in 
decisions governing access to higher education as compared to the 
dominant population. 
The litigants who brought the case at the lower level drew upon a 
creative potent theory that the Supreme Court was familiar with in the 
context of residential desegregation, school integration at the primary 
and secondary levels, and sexual orientation and public 
accommodations equality. The doctrine, known as the political process 
theory, has its origins in Justice Stone’s Footnote Four in Carolene 
 
 18.  See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1623 (2014) 
(misframing the issue); see also id. at 1638 (failing to apply strict scrutiny). 
 19.  Compare id., with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
 20.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978). 
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Products21 and was further developed in the writings of John Hart Ely.22 
Justice Stone’s footnote is particularly relevant to the appropriate 
standard of review necessary to the evaluation of legal measures that 
burden racial minorities. There, he raised the question of “whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, 
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”23 
Political process theory is designed to address the deficits of a 
democratic republic.24 In particular, the theory positions the judiciary 
as a counterpoint to the will of the majority, which has the potential to 
repeatedly frustrate the political representation of minorities.25 If the 
political structure facilitates the constant muting of minority voices (i.e. 
the expression of their political will), it has larger implications.26 Justice 
Stone’s footnote recognizes that the political disempowerment of 
minorities undermines democratic government. For those minorities 
who often see their political interests consistently disregarded, their 
faith in the political institutions purportedly dedicated to representing 
them is likely to be shattered. Political process theory operates from the 
premise that equality is not just a matter of being able to vote; it entails 
being able to propose and effect political outcomes. The theory aims to 
 
 21.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).   
 22.  JOHN HART ELY, supra note 6. The Federalist Papers – in particular Federalist No. 10 – 
provide additional historical grounding for the political process doctrine. THE FEDERALIST NO. 
10 (James Madison). Federalist No. 10’s significance for political process theory is Madison’s 
proposal that a representative republican government is the means to counter the influence of 
factional interests. Id. Madison writes: “A republic, by which I mean a government in which the 
scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which 
we are seeking.” Id. The Supreme Court has developed or applied the theory in several cases. See, 
e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist, No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 
(1982); Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. 
 23.  Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 24.  Ely explains that in order to accomplish the goals of republican government to function 
“in the interest of the whole people” it was necessary to develop a theory of representation “so 
as to ensure not simply that the representative would not sever his interests from those of a 
majority of his constituency but also that he would not sever a majority coalition’s interests from 
those of various minorities.” ELY, supra note 6, at 82. 
 25.  Id. at 77–88. 
 26.  This discussion is not asserting that all individuals within a delimited minority think 
alike. Rather, the point is that there are societal benefits, resources, and institutions to which 
certain minorities do not have equal access. When these minorities attempt to act in unison or at 
least as a cognizable group, the political structure fails to adequately take into account their 
selections and critiques to make the appropriate reforms. Without a mechanism to intervene and 
change that circumstance, the system remains structured in a way that perpetually disempowers 
them. 
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accomplish the notion of equality expressed in the Equal Protection 
Clause.27 The essential aspects of the political process argument require 
the court to apply strict scrutiny when the actions of a state work to 
place the “‘decisionmaking authority over’” a legal measure or policy 
at a removed level of government that “‘inures primarily to the benefit 
of the minority’” and that minorities would view as being “‘in their 
interest.’”28 A successful application of the theory by those that prevail 
upon it means that, state laws that “disadvantage[] any particular group 
by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf” may be 
held constitutionally invalid.29 
Lani Guinier posits that admissions decisions are “political as well 
as educational acts.”30 Included in the realm of the political are: the 
actions of weighing in on the decisionmaking processes and wielding 
influence over the governing bodies that issue decisions about how 
public academic institutions are structured; the criteria that determines 
who is admitted; and the programs that are implemented to stimulate 
the inclusion of diverse sectors of the population in the applicant pool. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the factors influencing the 
political process and to consider whether the power to guide, affect, and 
at times, determine the outcome of that process is evenly distributed or 
whether the process is structured in a way that preserves the status quo. 
Schuette presented this complex matter. 
A.  Born in a Firestorm 
Schuette emerged from the actions of opponents seeking to 
dismantle the groundbreaking racial equality gains of civil rights 
activists in the areas of education and employment. In a carefully 
crafted decision, the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law 
School’s admissions decisions practices allowing for a consideration of 
race in a narrowly tailored way in Grutter.31 Anti-affirmative action 
 
 27.  Ely comments that prior to the adoption of the Equal Protection Clause, the ideal of 
“‘equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that 
govern them’ . . . functioned as a component–even on occasion as a judicially enforceable 
component[]—of the concept of representation that had been the core of our Constitution from 
the beginning.” (citation omitted) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 
(1977)).  
 28.  Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist, No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982) (quoting Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 29.  Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393. See also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 468. 
 30.  Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: 
Guardians at the Gate of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 114 (2003).  
 31.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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groups in Michigan and in other parts of the country were determined 
to nullify the Court’s ruling. Building upon a strategy tested by special 
interest groups in California,32 in 2004 a group led by conservative 
businessman Wardell Connerly33 organized to secure the adoption of a 
ballot amending Michigan’s Constitution.34 The amendment, originally 
designated as Proposal 2, contained a provision prohibiting state 
entities (e.g. public schools) from drawing upon race-conscious policies 
in “public education, public employment, or public contracting . . . .”35 
As adopted, the effect of the amendment prohibited affirmative action 
in Michigan.36 Equally disturbing for proponents of affirmative action, 
Proposal 2 organizers styled their amendment, which was aimed at 
preserving the status quo, as the “Michigan Civil Rights 
Amendment.”37 In so doing, they were attempting to appropriate the 
civil rights legacy, but their efforts were geared towards undoing the 
 
 32.  See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving the battle 
against the anti-affirmative action initiative, Prop 209).  
 33.  Wardell Connerly is an African American businessman who has led several efforts in 
California and Colorado to abolish affirmative action in the United States. Mr. Connerly 
previously served on the University of California’s Board of Regents. See Dean E. Murphy, Top 
Foe of Affirmative Action Leaves California Regents, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/21/us/top-foe-of-affirmative-action-leaves-california-
regents.html; Charlie Savage, Affirmative Action Foe Is Facing Allegations of Financial Misdeeds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17. 2005, at A10. See also WARD CONNERLY, CREATING EQUAL: MY FIGHT 
AGAINST RACIAL PREFERENCES (2000).  
 34.  Karen W. Arenson, Ballot Measure Seen in Wake of Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/10/us/ballot-measure-seen-in-wake-of-court-ruling.html? 
ref=topics. See also Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. 
Supp. 2d 924, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 35.  The amendment added Section 26, Article I to the Michigan Constitution. It reads: 
Affirmative action programs. 
1. The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and 
any other public college or university, community college, or school district shall 
not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or 
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation 
of public employment, public education, or public contracting. 
2. The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in 
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. 
3. For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the 
state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or community college, 
school district, or other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or 
within the State of Michigan not included in sub-section 1.  
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 36.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (2014) (“Under 
the terms of the amendment, race-based preferences cannot be part of the admissions process for 
state universities”). 
 37.  See Michigan Civil Rights Amendment, Proposal 2 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA 
https://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Civil_Rights_Amendment,_Proposal_2 (2006) (last accessed 
Feb. 3, 2017). 
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work of civil rights organizations that were dedicated to overcoming 
the vestiges of slavery and securing equality for African Americans, 
other racial minorities, and females. The Proposal 2 advocates even 
referenced the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI as the legal 
foundation for their initiative.38 
Proposal 2 was highly controversial. The Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for 
Equality By Any Means Necessary (“BAMN”) sued, alleging that the 
amendment to Michigan’s Constitution was unconstitutional in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972.39  The district court concluded that in 
order to strike down Proposal 2, BAMN needed to show that the race-
conscious measures drawn upon by Michigan’s public colleges and 
universities “were required to combat [de jure] racial discrimination or 
prevent resegregation.”40 Because they failed to make this showing, the 
district court found Proposal 2 constitutionally valid.41 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit took an entirely different approach. 
Applying the political process doctrine,42 the Sixth Circuit held 
unconstitutional the “provisions affecting Michigan’s public colleges 
and universities.”43 BAMN alleged that for racial minorities44 who are 
the focus of corrective race-conscious admissions policies and 
practices45 enacted in their interest, Proposal 2 as applied to Michigan’s 
public colleges and universities, “impermissibly restructure[d] the 
 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 932. 
 40. Id. at. 957. In so reasoning, the court sought to distinguish between affirmative action 
programs that are “mandated by the obligation to cure past discrimination” and 
antidiscrimination laws “intended to protect against discrimination.” Id. But, the court’s logic is 
flawed in that it fails to acknowledge that affirmative action practices are appropriately 
categorized as measures “intended to protect against discrimination.” Id. See also GIRARDEAU 
SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 75 (2000). The district court’s mischaracterization of 
affirmative action, serves as the central basis for its ruling.  
 41.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 930. 
 42.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. 
By Any Means Necessary v. Regents of Univ. of Mich. (BAMN), 701 F.3d 466, 491 (6th Cir. 2012), 
rev’d en banc sub nom., Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  BAMN had previously identified in its district court pleadings three groups, African 
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, as being directly impacted by Proposal 2. Plaintiff’s 
Second Amended Class-Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at ¶3, Coal. to 
Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 960 (No. 06–15024). 
 45.  The term “corrective” refers to the actions that federal and state governments along 
with their various agencies and civil rights groups deemed necessary to counter the historical 
practices that gave rise to the inequities in education that prevail today.  
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political process” concerning school administrative matters thereby 
denying them equal access to the political process in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.46 
Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the 
amendment to Michigan’s constitution was constitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause.47 An exploration of how the Court arrived at 
its decision is necessary for highlighting what is at stake politically for 
historically marginalized racial minorities, and for exposing the 
inequitable and dangerous destabilizing risks that voter initiatives pose 
to substantive equality and fundamental constitutional guarantees. 
All these maneuvers undermine representative government and 
pave the way for direct democracy to rule, which leaves the political 
interests of certain racial minorities imperiled. In failing to subject the 
Proposal 2 voter initiative to strict scrutiny, the Court permitted the 
populist mechanism48 to replace the representative structure of 
republican government with its built in checks and balances. 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s words alarmingly invited the 
supplanting of this structure. That is, in characterizing Michigan’s 
adoption of the voter initiative as properly “bypassing public officials” 
who were not acting in accordance with the wishes of the majority and 
in declaring that the Constitution and the Court’s precedents furnished 
no legal grounding for “the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that 
commit this policy determination to the voters,” the Court favored the 
populist process over one of reasoned judicial intervention and 
protection.49 
When the Schuette Court referenced the events leading up to 
Michigan’s adoption of Proposal 2, it characterized the process as “a 
 
 46.  BAMN, 701 F.3d at 473. 
 47.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1623.  
 48.  Cain and Miller argue that populist strands eventually overtook progressive elements 
and co-opted the voter initiative. They maintain that current use of the initiative departs from the 
progressives’ initial conception of it “as an occasional ‘safety valve’ to make representative 
government more responsive and effective.” Cain & Miller, supra note 3, at 59. 
 49.  This Article agrees with Ely’s conclusion that the failure of the judiciary to act in this 
countermajoritarian way constitutes a breakdown in the democratic structure as conceptualized 
by the founders. The resulting dysfunction harms racial minorities. Ely writes: 
[E]ven before the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court  was 
prepared at least under certain conditions to protect the interests of minorities that 
were not literally voteless by constitutionally tying their interests to those of groups 
that did possess political power – and, what is the same thing, by intervening to protect 
such interests when it appeared that such a guarantee of ‘virtual representation’ was not 
being provided. 
ELY, supra note 6, at 84–85.  
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statewide debate on the question of racial preferences” and their 
consideration by state entities.50 The use of the phrase “statewide 
debate” suggests that several events significant to the democratic 
process occurred. It suggests that the organizers or the state adequately 
disseminated informative accurate information regarding the ballot 
initiative. It conjures up the idea of state residents being invited to 
participate in numerous hearings concerning the initiative and that the 
proponents were available to answer questions regarding its purpose 
and design. It leads the reader to believe that opponents of the ballot 
initiative were able to participate in the hearings and present their 
assessment of the proposal, and that the state legislators were given an 
opportunity to explain how the proposal conflicted with or facilitated 
existing state laws. 
Yet this was far from the truth. In contrast to the foregoing idealistic 
vision, Proposal 2’s saga was marked by deception, voter fraud, and a 
breakdown in the systems of state governance that are entrusted with 
protecting the rights of all its residents.51 This second tale of Schuette 
concerns the struggle of civil rights groups and pro-affirmative action 
supporters against the initiative in Michigan. Their battle unfolded in 
the context of community organizing and in the courts. Their enormous 
efforts demonstrate why it is not enough to propose reforming 
initiatives as a solution to the dangers they pose to minority rights 
issues. The saga demonstrates that in Michigan, and likely in other 
states as well, inadequate procedures are in place to ensure the integrity 
of the voting process.52 
Over a period of six months, Ward Connerly’s group, the Michigan 
Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”) collected signatures for its anti-
affirmative action petition so that it could be placed on the November 
2006 general election ballot.53 From the beginning, serious issues 
 
 50.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629. 
 51.  Operation King’s Dream v. Connerly (OKD), No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 at *3 4 
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (discussing the history of Proposal 2).  
 52.  NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUM 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL I&R TASK 
FORCE (July 2002) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 53.  OKD, 2006 WL 2514115 at *2. The procedures for Michigan’s initiative process are 
contained in Article XII, Section 2 of the Michigan Constitution. MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2. See 
MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT REGARDING THE USE OF FRAUD AND 
DECEPTION IN THE COLLECTION OF SIGNATURES FOR THE MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS BALLOT 
PETITION 1 (June 7, 2006), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/PetitionFraudreport_162009_7.pdf [hereinafter 
COMMISSION REPORT]. See also Arenson, supra note 34. 
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plagued Proposal 2 concerning the conduct of MCRI’s signature 
gatherers,54 the wording of the petition, and the validity of the 
signatures obtained.55 As a result, residents filed multiple complaints 
with several state agencies, including the Michigan Civil Rights 
Commission (the “Commission”). The Commission, acting under the 
powers granted to it in the state constitution, spent five months 
investigating the chief complaints that: (i) MCRI’s proposal was 
misleading in that it used the words “discrimination” or “preferential 
treatment” instead of the phrase “affirmative action,”56 and (ii) the 
signature gatherers falsely represented that the purpose of the petition 
was to support affirmative action rather than ban it.57 After holding a 
series of public hearings in which citizens testified, the Commission 
issued a scathing report containing numerous findings and 
recommendations.58 One essential finding was that MCRI engaged in 
several “misleading and false” practices that required the Attorney 
General’s attention and that of the Michigan Supreme Court in order 
to properly remediate the harm to the civil rights of Michigan’s 
electorate.59 
While the Commission conducted its investigation, a non-profit 
civil rights group, Operation King’s Dream (“OKD”), and BAMN filed 
several unsuccessful state court actions.60 Their attempts to stop the 
certification of MCRI’s petition were finally thwarted at the state court 
 
 54.  In preparation for his campaign for Proposal 2, Connerly revealed that he planned to 
hire a separate firm to obtain the necessary signatures and that he intended to pay them an 
estimated “$1.50 a signature, or about $725,000.” Arenson, supra note 34. Connerly did in fact 
hire an independent signature gathering firm. See OKD, 2006 WL 2514115 at *9. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at *4. See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53. The controversial petition 
language reads in relevant part: 
A Proposal to amend the Michigan Constitution by adding a Section 25 to Article I that 
would: (1) prohibit the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State 
University, and any other public college or university, community college, or school 
district from discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual 
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of 
public employment, public education, or public contracting; (2) prohibit the State from 
discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group on 
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education, or public contracting. 
OKD, 2006 WL 2514115 at *19 n.2.  
 57.  Id. at *4. 
 58.  COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53.  
 59.  Id. at 12–13. 
 60.  On its website, BAMN describes itself as “a primarily student–and youth-based 
organization of leaders in our schools and communities, committed to making real the promises 
of American democracy and equality.” See BAMN, http://www.bamn.com/about-bamn (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2017).  
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level when Michigan’s Supreme Court declined to review the 
Commission’s report and held that the relevant inquiry regarding the 
petition was limited to whether the board of canvassers acted within its 
limited scope of authority to verify that the required number of 
signatures had been obtained and to certify the petition on that basis.61 
After making that determination, the court concluded it was not 
empowered to examine the specific actions and representations of the 
signature gatherers.62 The court reasoned that it was not appropriate 
for it to decide, “what constitutes a ‘fair’ representation concerning 
matters of political dispute” but rather those determinations should be 
left up to the voters.63 Even though the stakes were high because of the 
initiative’s potential impact on the federal constitutional rights of 
disfavored racial minorities to meaningfully participate in the political 
structure concerning educational policies that pertain to them, the 
court opted not to act. Instead, it severely circumscribed the contours 
of its duty. As a result, no probing evaluation of Michigan’s initiative 
process occurred at the state court level. 
Undeterred, in 2006 OKD filed a case against the state and MCRI 
in federal court alleging that MCRI had committed voter fraud in 
violation of the Voting Rights Act by engaging in several misleading 
practices that resulted in MCRI improperly obtaining signatures in 
support of its petition.64 Two striking aspects of the OKD case 
demonstrate the real threat that voter initiatives pose to constitutional 
rights and to the structure of the legal system, which is dependent upon 
the counterweighting actions of its various branches to ensure that hard 
won protections and rights are safeguarded.65 First, although the district 
court judge made findings66 that recognized MCRI engaged in a 
 
 61.  Mich. Civil Rights Initiative v. Bd. of State Canvassers, 716 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2006). 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. 
 64.  OKD, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006). Specifically, 
the plaintiffs alleged that: (i) MCRI directed its voter fraud practices towards certain communities 
based upon their race thereby denying them equal access to the political process; (ii) the petition 
did not clearly state that the purpose of the measure was to abolish the use of affirmative action 
by public schools and other entities in the state of Michigan but rather used phrases such as 
“preferential treatment,” and “discriminating against”; and (iii) MCRI obtained a substantial 
number of signatures through their fraudulent practices. Id. at *1, *2, *19. There was evidence 
that approximately “125,000 signatures” of minorities were obtained in support of the petition, as 
a result of the fraudulent practices. Id. at *2.  
 65.  Id. 
 66.  The findings, inter alia, included: 1) “MCRI and its circulators engaged in a pattern of 
voter fraud by deceiving voters into believing that the petition supported affirmative action”; 2) 
“The conduct of the petitioners went beyond mere ‘puffery’ and was in fact fraudulent because it 
objectively misrepresented the purpose of the petition”; 3) “The MCRI defendants were aware 
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“pattern of voter fraud,” the court nonetheless concluded that no 
Michigan law prohibited signature gatherers from lying to individuals 
regarding the substance and purpose of the voter initiative petition 
being circulated.67 Second, the judge ruled that the petition was subject 
to Section 2 of Voting Rights Act.68 But rather than this resulting in a 
win for OKD, the court reasoned that because MCRI subjected all the 
petition signers to the same fraudulent practices, a Section 2 violation 
could not be established.69 Despite the outcome, OKD’s framing of 
their issue in this way was useful because it invoked the history of 
discrimination in voting and it required the court to revisit the purposes 
of the Act. 70 Raising a Section 2 claim reminds courts that racial 
discrimination in voting may manifest itself in innumerable ways.71 
Therefore, courts must be vigilant in ferreting them out.72 The exercise 
of judicial review illuminates places where there may be gaps between 
statutory voting laws, designed to achieve substantive equality in 
political representation and in equalizing the potency of the votes of 
racial minorities who are relegated to the periphery of political 
discourse, and current practices of discrimination.73 
 
of and encouraged such deception by disguising their proposal as a ban on “preferences” and 
“discrimination,” without ever fulfilling their responsibility to forthrightly clarify what these 
terms were supposed to mean”; and 4) Jennifer Gratz’s testimony was “evasive and misleading 
[and] [h]er denial of an invitation to participate in the [Commission’s] investigation was not 
credible in light of the Commission’s detailed and thorough report.” See id. at *11, *19. 
 67.  Judge Tarnow summarized the testimony of State Director of Elections Christopher 
Thomas regarding the legality of making misrepresentations to individuals being solicited for 
their signatures on voter-initiative petitions: “[Thomas] also testified that there is no provision of 
state law addressing statements made by circulators of initiative petitions to potential signers . . . 
.  Thomas testified that to his knowledge it is not a crime under Michigan law to misrepresent the 
purpose of an initiative petition.” Id. at *8. The court also found the evidence furnished by 
Michigan’s Secretary of State that fifty signatures out of a random sample of 500 were invalid. Id. 
at *2. 
 68.  Id. at *14. 
 69.  Id. at *17. The court further noted, “The Court finds it distressing that its finding of a 
lack of discrimination is based on the fact that minority and non-minority voters had equal access 
to a deceptive political process.” See id. at *19. 
 70.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2615 (2013) (Section 2 is intended to “to address 
entrenched racial discrimination in voting.”). 
 71.  See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1651–79 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 72.  Reynolds v. Sims, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1381 (1964) (“any alleged infringement of the right to 
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”). See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 
645 (1993).  
 73.  This Article shares Bertrall Ross’s view that the Voting Rights Act, “rather than simply 
being seen as a vehicle that is enforcing a constitutional antidiscrimination requirement, should 
also be seen as one enforcing the constitutional principle of representative equality.” See Bertrall 
L. Ross, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent 
Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 166 (2012).  
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The OKD case highlights the lack of responsiveness of judicial, 
administrative, and local systems to address serious infringements that 
voter initiatives inflict on constitutional equality principles and civil 
rights.74 If no level of government will acknowledge their duties, it 
leaves racial minorities who are seeking to defend their constitutional 
rights in a precarious state. 
B.  Critique of the Schuette Decision 
One plausible interpretation of the Schuette decision is to view it as 
the product of a simplistic yet challenging syllogism: Affirmative action 
is not an express constitutional right; it is a privilege that state entities 
can extend under certain circumstances.75 Because it is a privilege and 
not a right, the state can prohibit its use.76 Relying upon a “democratic 
process” like an initiative to deny a privilege is not unconstitutional.77 
The University of Michigan was not required to use affirmative action; 
it was permitted to do so.78 If Michigan’s public academic institutions 
elect not to incorporate affirmative action policies into their admissions 
decisions, this is not unconstitutional. Public colleges and universities 
are subject to state policy. State policy may be decided by popular 
vote.79 Therefore, the decision regarding whether state institutions may 
utilize affirmative action may be determined by popular vote without 
infringing upon the constitution.80  Casting the decision in this 
favorable light grounds Schuette in democratic principles and frames it 
in terms of objective standards. 
The syllogism is deficient in that it fails to acknowledge that one of 
the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause is to allocate 
decisionmaking responsibility to the Court over matters concerning 
race. Where racial classifications are involved and a challenge is 
 
 74.  OKD, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (“With the 
exception of Michigan’s Civil Rights Commission, the record shows that the state has 
demonstrated an almost complete institutional indifference to the credible allegations of voter 
fraud raised by the Plaintiffs.”).  
 75.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629–32. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. at 1636. 
 78.  Id. at 1629–32. 
 79.  Regarding the voters’ adoption of race-based policies or the prohibition of them in 
school decisions, the Schuette Court concluded, “[t]he holding in the instant case is simply that 
the courts may not disempower the voters from choosing which path to follow.” Id. at 1635. 
 80.  See id. at 1636 (“By approving Proposal 2 and thereby adding §26 to their State 
Constitution, the Michigan voters exercised their privilege to enact laws as a basic exercise of 
their democratic power.”). 
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brought, it is the Court’s responsibility to act.81 In other words, the 
Court not only must decide who gets to decide policy matters involving 
race, but also it must evaluate whether the laws and policies that 
implicate race are constitutionally permissible.  Here, even if one 
accepts that the Court properly determined that it was constitutionally 
valid for Michigan to subject the question of race-conscious admissions 
to the electorate, it failed to fulfill its other responsibility to evaluate 
whether the legal measure was also consistent with the constitution. In 
order to perform that analysis, the Court needed to examine its effects. 
Even though the process may be constitutionally valid, the product of 
that process may not be. The following sections address the omissions 
of the Schuette Court in more detail. 
1.  Inadequate Framing of the Issues 
Justice Kennedy framed the question in Schuette in terms of the 
democratic process: 
[W]hether and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to 
prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in governmental 
decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.82 
In posing this question, the Court was making certain assumptions 
about how democracy operates in the United States. The Court 
presumed that the political process unfolds with fairness and without 
the cloud of voter fraud. There was a presumption about intellectual, 
learned, rationale debate occurring amongst voters, and the suggestion 
that the votes were cast only after the issues had been thoroughly 
vetted and every interested party had an opportunity to express their 
opinions and present them in a public forum.83 The Court’s vision 
 
 81.  Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (“[T]he core of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official distinctions based on race.”).  
 82.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623. Justice Kennedy’s framing of the question is strikingly different 
from that of the Sixth Circuit, which concluded that: 
[T]he sole issue before us is whether Proposal 2 runs afoul of the constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection by removing the power of university officials to even 
consider using race as a factor in admissions decisions — something they are specifically 
allowed to do under Grutter. 
BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 473 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 83.  Justice Kennedy writes: 
Here Michigan voters acted in concert and statewide to seek a consensus and adopt a 
policy on a difficult subject against a historical background of race in America that has 
been a source of tragedy and persisting injustices . . . Were the Court to rule that the 
question addressed by Michigan voters is too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp 
of the electorate . . . or that these matters are so arcane that the electorate’s power must 
be limited because the people cannot prudently exercise that power even after a full 
debate, that holding be an unprecedented restriction on the exercise of a fundamental 
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further assumed a constitutional competency level amongst voters 
enabling them to make decisions regarding fundamental constitutional 
guarantees. This is a woefully inaccurate picture of what often occurs in 
initiative campaigns.84 Moreover, as this Article highlights, the 
Michigan Amendment was not the result of a fully participatory 
process in which an informed and engaged electorate succeeded in 
having the initiative included on the general election ballot for 
consideration by Michigan voters, but rather the product of fraud and 
deception.85 A fully participatory process must fulfill certain requisites 
related to the substance (i.e. the impact of one’s vote on election 
outcomes) and procedures of voting.86 Regarding procedure, the 
government must ensure that comprehensive and accurate information 
is provided to the citizenry.87 The electorate must have extensive access 
to polling places.88 There must not be unreasonable time, place, or 
eligibility restrictions.89 Regarding substance, states and the federal 
government must take care to ensure that the political system is not 
structured in a way that chronically discounts the effect of the political 
choices of racial minorities.90 
The Schuette Court’s query also ignored how the status of being a 
disfavored racial minority is politically disadvantaging in a way that is 
difficult (if not impossible) to overcome. The question failed to 
appreciate the necessity for the safeguards within our political system 
and the need for judicial intervention when certain constitutional rights 
 
right held not just by one person but by all in common.  
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637. 
 84.  See Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 1730, 1745 (2013). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52. 
 85.  See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 53. 
 86.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964) (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1, 18 (1964)) (“Wesberry clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative 
government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without 
regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State”).  
 87.  As the Court concluded in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442 (1992), “the right to 
vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the 
integrity of the democratic system.” Providing reliable information so that voters can make 
informed choices is essential to the proper functioning of democracy. See James A. Gardner, 
Protecting the Rationality of Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 
U. CHI. L. REV. 892, 897 (citations omitted) (“[A]ccurate issue voting depends upon [the voter 
having] accurate relevant information.”). 
 88.  See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 (1966).  
 89.  Id. at 656.  
 90.  See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 347 (1960) (“In no case involving 
unequal weight in voting distribution that has come before the Court did the decision sanction a 
differentiation on racial lines whereby approval was given to unequivocal withdrawal of the vote 
solely from colored citizens.”). 
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and issues of equality are at stake.91 A more complex question that 
would have fully accounted for BAMN’s arguments is: Do states violate 
the Equal Protection Clause when voters amend their state 
constitution to: 1) deny racial minorities a voice in the process that 
determines whether or not they have equal access to education; and 2) 
target racial minorities by prohibiting a policy that is designed to secure 
their equal protection rights? This question would have required the 
Court to apply strict scrutiny because it acknowledges that racial 
classifications are involved.92 
Reframing the Court’s inquiry in the way proposed would be in 
keeping with precedent.93 Voters are unlikely to evaluate initiatives 
from the vantage point of whether they are consistent with 
constitutional guarantees.94 It is the responsibility of judges to 
undertake this analysis to assess whether constitutional rights have 
been adequately protected. This is their “special role.”95 
Just as the Schuette Court inadequately cast the relevant question 
for its consideration, it was incorrect in its conclusion that the “case is 
not about the constitutionality . . . of race-conscious admissions policies 
in higher education.”96 Proposal 2 threatened the Court’s holding in 
Grutter. Grutter affirmed that higher education admissions committees 
 
 91.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651–1679 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 92.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 93.  As the Court concluded in Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1: 
The issue here, after all, is not whether Washington has the authority to intervene in 
the affairs of the local school boards; it is, rather, whether the State has exercised that 
authority in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 
458 U.S. 457, 476 (1982).  
 94.  Ilya Somin, in critiquing idealist views of “deliberative democracy” (i.e. the practice of 
citizens substantially engaging in government through extensive debate over political policies and 
laws) argues that, in general, American voters lack essential knowledge regarding political 
institutions, the structure of government, and foundational documents such as the federal 
constitution. See Ilya Somin, Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance, 22 CRITICAL REV. 
253, 257–62 (2010). Somin concludes that even with increased education levels and improvements 
in information accessibility through technology, voters are ill equipped to perform the tasks that 
deliberative democracy expects of them. See id. at 261. Applying those insights to voter initiatives 
supports the argument that voters lack the requisite political and constitutional literacy to decide 
constitutional issues that implicate matters of racial equality. See id. at 262. See also THE 
ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, NEW ANNENBERG STUDY ASKS: HOW WELL DO 
AMERICANS UNDERSTAND THE CONSTITUTION? (2011), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicy 
center.org/new-annenberg-survey-asks-how-well-do-americans-understand-the-constitution/ 
(last accessed Nov. 16, 2016).  
 95.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 486 (stating courts have a “special role in safeguarding 
the interests of those groups ‘relegated to . . . position[s] of political powerlessness’”) (quoting 
San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).  
 96.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630.  
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can consider race in their admissions decisions, as long as the 
decisionmaking committees review candidate files in a holistic way. 
Considering race as one factor among several, this practice does not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment..97 Because Michigan’s 
Amendment precludes the consideration of race, it impinges on the 
viability of the Grutter holding. 
2.  The Schuette Court’s Encounter with the Political Process 
Doctrine 
a.  Failure to Apply the Political Process Doctrine 
Building upon the inadequate frame the Schuette Court established 
for its decision, rather than applying the political process doctrine, the 
Court devoted substantial energy towards demonstrating that the 
theory did not apply.98 The political process theory requires a multi-part 
analysis.99 It must be demonstrated that the legal measure: 1) “has a 
racial focus targeting a policy or program that ‘inures primarily to the 
benefit of the minority’”; and 2) “reallocates political power or 
reorders the decision making process in a way that places special 
burdens on a minority group’s ability to achieve its goals through that 
process.”100 If these elements are satisfied, the challenged law is subject 
to strict scrutiny.101 Strict scrutiny requires that the state demonstrate 
that the challenged law serves a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly tailored.102 
At the district court level, BAMN argued, because Proposal 2: 
creat[ed] a political process that sets aside race, among other 
categories, for consideration “at a new and remote level of 




 97.  Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 98.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636 (“The instant case presents the question involved in Coral 
and Wilson but not involved in Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle.”).  
 99.  BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472 
and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)). 
 100.  Id. at 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472 (1982); 
Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (1969)).  
 101.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472, 474, 482 n.28.  
 102.  Grutter, 539 U.S. 306. 
 103.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 
924, 934 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (quoting Cantrell Amend. Complaint at ¶¶57, 58; Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 458 U.S. at 470, 483).  
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The political process BAMN was referring to was that of the public 
universities and colleges. Specifically, these institutions have a 
governance structure composed of the elected Board of Regents, or a 
board of trustees, and of entities delegated by the boards to serve that 
structure.104 The boards authorize the various schools (including the 
faculties and administrators) within the system to design their own 
admissions procedures and policies.105 This structure is common to 
many American public higher education institutions.106 Prior to the 
adoption of Proposal 2, individuals had access to influence the 
decisionmaking of school administrations by petitioning or lobbying 
the boards on numerous matters.107 In fact, supporters of the race-
conscious policies successfully did exactly that.108 After Michigan’s 
adoption of Proposal 2, individuals could continue to present proposals 
and otherwise lobby the board with the prospect of influencing its 
decisions for all matters except issues concerning race. 
Because Proposal 2 amended Michigan’s constitution, the only 
available means to those seeking to restore race-conscious admissions 
policies in the state would be to secure the amendment’s repeal. The 
monetary costs and political capital involved make the accomplishment 
of this feat extremely unlikely.109 The procedure would require the 
amendment’s opponents to organize voters, obtain enough signatures 
to have their ballot certified and presented to the general electorate, 
and then win a majority of the votes for its passage.110 If nothing else, it 
is clear that minority groups, such as African Americans, who have 
 
 104.  Id. at 935.  
 105.  Id. at 935–36. 
 106.  See MIDWESTERN HIGHER EDUCATION COMPACT, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS AND HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE POLICY REPORT 2 (2013), http://www. 
mhec.org/sites/mhec.org/files/20130516state-constitutional-provisions-highered-governance.pdf. 
See also Colleges and Organizational Structure of Universities – Governing Boards, The President, 
Faculty, Administration and Staff, Students, Future Prospects, http://education.state 
university.com/pages/1859/Colleges-Universities-Organizational-Structure.html (last checked 
Jan. 2, 2017). 
 107.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 954.  
 108.  Id. at 930, 936. 
 109.  The Court in BAMN summarized the Michigan’s constitutional amendment process: 
Just to place a proposed constitutional amendment repealing Proposal 2 on the ballot 
would require either the support of two-thirds of both Michigan House of 
Representatives and Senate, see Mich. Const. art XII, § 1, or the signatures of a number 
of voters equivalent to at least ten percent of the number of votes cast for all candidates 
for governor in the preceding general election. See id. art XII, § 2. Once on the ballot, 
the proposed amendment must then earn the support of a majority of the voting 
electorate to undo Proposal 2’s categorical ban. See id. art XII, §§ 1–2. 
BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 484 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 110.  See MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2. 
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historically been denied voting rights or have confronted significant 
barriers in their attempts to exercise their rights111 and who may also 
have relatively constrained monetary wealth112 are more burdened in 
seeking to accomplish a constitutional amendment that directly 
pertains to their interests concerning equal educational opportunities 
than the majority white population. Regardless of whether it is an 
economic and political reality that individuals are required to spend 
money in order to achieve certain socio-economic or political 
outcomes, the idea that individuals need to have enough wealth in 
order to secure their constitutional rights is disturbing. The process is 
unequal for racial minorities in a way it is not for other groups who may 
choose to petition public universities to consider other factors, such as 
athletic background, class status, or legacy ties.113 This is so because with 
the adoption of Proposal 2, it is no longer within the purview of the 
universities’ discretion to consider race. 
b.  Failure to Distinguish Political Process Theory Precedents 
The Schuette Court concluded that political process theory didn’t 
apply.114 In so ruling, it not only sought to distinguish the facts of 
Schuette from the relevant precedents of Hunter v. Erickson115 and 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,116 but also attempted to 
undermine the prior case law. Despite its efforts, the Court failed. The 
Court’s approach and its inconsistent reception to the political process 
doctrine in other contexts raise serious questions of judicial fairness 
and contravene basic principles of representative government. As John 
Hart Ely observed, representative government does not: 
 
 
 111.  See Atiba R. Ellis, Race, Class, & Structural Discrimination: On Vulnerability Within the 
Political Process, 28 J. OF C.R. & ECON. DEV. 33 (2015). See also SPANN, supra note 40, at 85–155.  
 112.  The Pew Research Center reported in December 2014 that the “wealth of white 
households was 13 times the median wealth of black households.” RAKEESH KOKCHHAR & 
RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, WEALTH INEQUALITY REPORT (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/. 
 113.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 
924, 936 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that “[i]n response to Proposal 2’s passage, the universities 
eliminated race from their admissions criteria but continued to consider various other 
nonacademic factors, such as geography, alumni connections, socioeconomic status, and athletic 
ability.”). 
 114.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637–38 (2014). (“For 
reasons already discussed, Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle are not precedents that stand for the 
conclusion that Michigan’s voters must be disempowered from acting.”). 
 115.  393 U.S. 385 (1969).  
 116.  458 U.S. 457 (1982).  
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Mean that groups that constitute minorities of the population can 
never be treated less favorably than the rest, but it does preclude a 
refusal to represent them,[] the denial to minorities of what 
Professor Dworkin has called “equal concern and respect in the 
design and administration of the political institutions that govern 
them.”117 
The Schuette decision evinces the Court’s failure to give due 
attention to the racial minorities before them who were asserting their 
interests and highlighting how those interests had been compromised 
by direct democracy. 
The Schuette Court structured its decision in terms of three cases, 
Reitman v. Mulkey,118 Hunter, and Seattle. All three cases involved 
voter-initiated amendments.119 All three measures were determined by 
the United States Supreme Court to be unconstitutional in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.120 Schuette grouped together Reitman, 
Hunter, and Seattle in support of the proposition that only where the 
state can be viewed as engaging in the constitutionally impermissible 
discriminatory action of “inflict[ing] injury by reason of race” (e.g. such 
as enacting or enforcing laws that prohibit certain races from being 
served in public restaurants)121 can the Court strike down the 
challenged legal measure under the Fourteenth Amendment.122 
The Court’s treatment of Reitman is flawed for several reasons. The 
main issue is the difference in the type of case that Reitman presents as 
compared to Schuette and its precedents. Reitman was not a political 
process doctrine case.123 Reitman is not like Hunter and Seattle because 
 
 117.  ELY, supra note 6, at 82 (footnotes omitted). 
 118.  387 U.S. 369 (1967).  
 119.  387 U.S. at 370–71 (describing that the state constitutional amendment was “an initiated 
measure submitted to the people as Proposition 14 in a statewide ballot in 1964”); see also Hunter, 
393 U.S. at 386–89; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 462–63. 
 120.  Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 
487.  
 121.  Reitman, 387 U.S. at 375–81 (discussing cases involving equal protection violations).  
 122.  In commenting on the three cases, the Schuette Court concluded: 
Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle are . . . cases . . . in which the political restriction in 
question was designed to be used, or was  likely to be used, to encourage the infliction 
of injury by reason of race. 
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637–38 (2014). 
 123.  It is also worth noting that the Hunter Court specifically distinguished Reitman, noting 
that Reitman did not involve “an explicitly racial classification.” See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389 
(“Here, unlike Reitman, there was an explicitly racial classification treating racial housing matters 
differently from other racial and housing matters.”). While the Hunter Court’s description is 
accurate given that the Reitman initiative did not reference race, the point has limited utility 
because restricting the state from interfering with the “absolute discretion” of property owners in 
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it does not involve political process theory and does not shed light on 
how the theory is to be applied. In grouping the three cases, the Schuette 
Court undercuts and subverts the precedential value of Hunter and 
Seattle. Neither of the plaintiff-couples in the lower court cases related 
to Reitman framed their arguments in terms of the political process 
doctrine.124 This is significant because a complainant asserting a 
political process argument must identify a political process that they 
are either excluded from participating in or their access to the process 
is significantly encumbered as compared to the politically or racially 
dominant majority.125 Unlike Hunter which dealt with the process of 
enacting fair housing legislation,126 or Seattle which dealt with the 
process of public school boards for making decisions regarding policies 
and procedures, or Schuette which dealt with the process of the boards 
of public universities concerning their policies and the process of 
adopting a state constitutional amendment, the plaintiff-respondents in 
Reitman did not allege that they were excluded from a political process. 
Instead, they asserted that the contested law was racially discriminatory 
and contravened the antidiscrimination provisions of the California 
Code.127 As discussed below, the Court analyzed the case and rendered 
its decision based on the Equal Protection Clause.128 Reitman supports 
the position that where the challenged law can be read as involving the 
state government in “invidious” “private discriminations,” it must be 
deemed violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and invalidated.129 
Accordingly, the Reitman Court’s focus was not on the political process 
doctrine but rather on identifying when the action or inaction of state 
government may be said to constitute racial discrimination.130 
 
their private real estate matters nonetheless implicates suspect classifications under the Federal 
Constitution. Id. This effect would be apparent with the filing of individual lawsuits alleging that 
landlords were engaging in racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
failing to rent to people of certain races. 
 124.  Reitman involved the consolidation of two cases. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 372. Both sets of 
plaintiffs grounded their arguments in terms of anti-discrimination provisions of the California 
Code. Id. On appeal, the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the couples based upon the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 372–73. 
 125.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 485–87.  
 126.  Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389.  
 127.  Reitman, 387 U.S. at 372–73. 
 128.  See id. at 376 (“The judgment of the California court was that s 26 unconstitutionally 
involves the state in racial discriminations and is therefore invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. There is no sound reason for rejecting this judgment.”).  
 129.  Id. at 380–81. 
 130.  The Reitman Court specifically declined to propose a test for making the determination 
of when state action constitutes racial discrimination. Id. at 378. As to the facts of the case, the 
Court concluded, “Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing 
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The Reitman initiative concerned the private right to discriminate 
in real estate transactions. 131 California voters adopted the initiative, 
known as Proposition 14, in 1964 in response to the state’s anti-
discrimination statutes, which were aimed at, inter alia, securing racial 
equality in housing.132 Proposition 14 prohibited the state from placing 
restrictions on the discretion of individuals or private entities to choose 
who to engage with in their private real estate exchanges.133 The 
Reitman Court held that the challenged provision required the state to 
become unconstitutionally enmeshed in racial discrimination.134 
Relying upon this holding, the Schuette Court concluded that because 
the same could not be said of Michigan’s Amendment, it did not run 
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.135 Here, the Court misapplied 
Reitman and attempted to fashion a rule that does not encapsulate the 
elements of the political process doctrine. 
If Reitman is to be applied, the lessons that one may draw from the 
case support invalidating Michigan’s Amendment, not upholding it as 
the Schuette Court concluded. Regarding the matter of state 
involvement, Michigan’s Amendment does implicate the state in 
matters of racial discrimination. However, in Schuette the argument 
pertains to the political process. This difference is significant. 
Michigan’s adoption of the amendment alters the political process so 
as to burden certain minorities (e.g. African Americans, Latinos, and 
Native Americans), compared to the politically dominant white 
majority population in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The 
constitutional amendment operates in a way that harms racial 
minorities who previously benefitted from race-conscious admissions 
policies. By allowing this inequitable treatment, which is linked to race, 
to persist, the state may be said to be condoning racial discrimination. 
Another way that Reitman could be read to support the invalidation 
of the Michigan Amendment is by adhering to the principle that the 
 
law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does 
authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.” Id. at 380–81.  
 131.  Reitman’s Proposition 14 provided in relevant part: 
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, 
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires  to sell, lease or 
rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to 
such person or persons as he, in his  absolute discretion chooses. 
Id. at 371. 
 132.  Id. at 374. 
 133.  Id. at 374–76. 
 134.  Id. at 376.  
 135.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637–38 (2014). 
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fact that voters generated the challenged measure does not alter the 
Court’s duty to rigorously evaluate its impact on constitutional rights.136 
Reitman supports the argument that more than deferential scrutiny is 
warranted to determine how the state is operating when a voter 
initiative is at issue and a claim of discrimination is brought.137 
Reitman’s place in deciding cases involving voter initiatives supports 
this paper’s argument that, such mechanisms should not be permitted 
to automatically trump fundamental constitutional guarantees. 
The next case that Schuette contends with is Hunter. Unlike 
Reitman, Hunter is a political process theory case. Accordingly, the 
Schuette Court needed to apply the conceptual approach of Hunter to 
the facts in order to properly evaluate BAMN’s arguments. 
In Hunter, voters in the City of Akron organized to counter an 
ordinance adopted by the city council to address racially discriminatory 
practices in Akron’s residential real estate market. Relying upon the 
referendum mechanism,138 opponents of the fair housing ordinance, 
after obtaining support from “[ten percent] of Akron’s voters,”139 
successfully secured the inclusion of a proposed amendment to Akron’s 
charter on the general election ballot. The charter amendment 
effectively repealed the city council’s ordinance and reconfigured the 
process for passing similar fair housing ordinances in the future by 
requiring that a majority of the electorate approve them rather than 
merely the city council.140 
 
 136.  Reitman calls for a case-by-case assessment of when a state may be viewed as being 
involved in private discriminatory action to a degree that constitutes the state’s endorsement or 
commission of discrimination. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 378. While the Court did not identify the level 
of scrutiny it applied to the Reitman initiative, it did reveal that like the California Supreme Court, 
it was focusing on the “purpose, scope, and operative effect” of the initiative. Id. at 374. In this 
respect, Reitman shares in common with Hunter, the conclusion that reliance upon direct 
democracy vehicles to accomplish constitutional changes does not insulate the initiative from the 
Court’s scrutiny as to whether it complies with the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1969). 
 137.  Reitman, 387 U.S. at 378–79 (rejecting the notion that there is an invariable test to 
determine impermissible state action in private discrimination).  
 138.  Even though the mechanism is called a “referendum” in Hunter, it is not clear that the 
process involved the initial input of the legislature before being referred to the voters, as is 
typically the case. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390, 392 (concluding that the fact that the amendment 
was established through a referendum does not protect it from judicial scrutiny).  
 139.  Id. at 387.  
 140.  The amendment to the city charter read: 
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which regulates the use, 
sale, advertisement, transfer, listing agreement, lease, sublease or financing of real 
property of any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin or ancestry must first by approved by a majority of the electors voting 
on the question at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective. 
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After a majority voted in favor of the amendment, Nellie Hunter, 
an African American female, brought suit to compel Akron’s 
Commission on Equal Opportunity in Housing and other city officials’ 
compliance with the fair housing ordinance.141 Hunter alleged that the 
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause in that it subjected 
individuals who sought protection against racial discrimination in 
housing transactions to a more demanding process. The Court agreed, 
reasoning that because the charter amendment instituted a different 
more taxing process for matters involving “race, color, religion, national 
origin or ancestry”142 and real transactions, it “discriminates against 
minorities, and constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious denial of 
equal protection of the laws.”143 The differential treatment in 
government matters contravenes the Equal Protection Clause in that, 
“the State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making 
it more difficult to meet legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any 
person’s vote or give any group a smaller representation than another 
of comparable size.”144 
The Schuette Court distinguished Hunter by arguing that if the 
latter upheld the charter amendment it would have meant that the state 
was being compelled to commit or permit harm based upon race 
because the adopted law would preclude it from intervening to stop 
discrimination in real estate dealings.145 In contrast, the same could not 
be said of the Schuette Court’s decision to uphold the Michigan 
amendment because it has anti-discriminatory language in it. But given 
that there was no de jure discrimination at issue in Hunter,146 the 
emphasis on state action as a basis for distinguishing both cases is not 
valid. Despite the Schuette Court’s efforts to differentiate them, the 
amendments are facially similar.147 Neither amendment expresses an 
 
Any such ordinance in effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall cease to be 
effective until approved by the electors as provided herein. 
Akron City Charter § 137.  
 141.  Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387. 
 142.  Id. at 389 (“Only laws to end housing discrimination based on ‘race, color, religion, 
national origin or ancestry’ must run s 137’s gauntlet.”).  
 143.  Id. at 393. 
 144.  Id. at 391–93.  
 145.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014) (concluding 
that in Hunter “there was a demonstrated injury on the basis of race that, by reasons of state 
encouragement or participation, became more aggravated.”).  
 146.  The facts of Hunter recount that the city council implemented the fair housing ordinance 
based “on a recognition of the social and economic losses to society” which are outgrowths of de 
facto segregation. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.  
 147.  See Akron City Charter § 137; see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 371 (1967).  
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intention to discriminate on the basis of race. In order to discern the 
impact of both amendments, it is necessary to refer to the context.148 
The political process doctrine requires the Court to focus on the harm 
that the legal measure inflicts.149 
The harm concerning the political process and racial minorities in 
both cases is the same. Both Proposal 2 in Schuette and the charter 
amendment in Hunter subject individuals to different processes. The 
primary basis of separating individuals is by race. This is clear when one 
considers the context of both amendments. The charter amendment 
arose in response to the city’s adoption of anti-discriminatory housing 
ordinances. The impetus for Michigan’s amendment was the Court’s 
upholding of race-conscious admissions. While residential and school 
integration can be viewed as goods accruing to society’s benefit as a 
whole, disfavored racial minorities are the ones who would 
immediately feel the harm of a real estate agent steering them away 
from a neighborhood of their choice based upon race (even if the 
reason is not made express by the agent). The same can be said of 
academically underrepresented racial minorities in Michigan who will 
experience the harm of not having the benefit of all the educational 
opportunities that they would have otherwise enjoyed absent the 
amendment. It is important to acknowledge that a central objective of 
affirmative action is to counter the disadvantages that racial minorities 
and females suffer as a result of persistent systemic, historical, and 
societal inequities. The consequence of upholding both amendments 
would be the same. There would be no immediately viable means for 
redressing the harm caused. The harmed parties would need to seek 
political change through the new process imposed. 
Thus, where race is implicated, subjecting individuals seeking to 
secure or enforce laws or policies devoted to racial equality in housing 
and education to a different process from those individuals seeking to 
shape housing and educational laws and policies in other respects, 
without a compelling legitimate reason, constitutes a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The decisive factor for the application of the 
political process theory is the manner in which the voter mechanism is 
 
 148.  In ruling, the Court referred to the ordinance that was nullified by the Hunter 
amendment noting that, “[i]t is against this background that the referendum required by s 137 
must be assessed.” Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. 
 149.  The Hunter Court underscored the importance of examining the effect of the law to 
conclude that, “although the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical 
manner, the reality is the law’s impact falls on the minority.” Id. at 391.  
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operating. Just as the Hunter Court concluded that the referendum 
must be struck down because it “disadvantages those who would 
benefit from laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral discriminations 
as against those who would bar other discriminations or who would 
otherwise regulate the real estate market in their favor,”150 the same 
logic would have applied in Schuette. With the enactment of Proposal 
2, advocates of race-conscious university policies are treated differently 
from advocates of other types of university policies. 
The third case the Court distinguished, Seattle, also involved the 
political process theory. Examining Seattle is not only relevant for its 
guidance on the application of political process doctrine to voter 
initiatives, but also for assessing the shortcomings of the Schuette 
decision. At issue in Seattle was an initiative (“Initiative 350”) that 
residents151 crafted in opposition to Seattle School District No. 1’s 
(“Seattle District”) plan to desegregate its schools through a 
compulsory busing scheme.152 Seattle District created the plan in 
response to the hyper-segregation153 that pervaded the city’s 
neighborhoods. Residential racial segregation throughout the city in 
the 1960s until the 1980s contributed to extreme racial segregation in 
the public schools. Busing seemed like an appropriate antidote.154 
Initiative 350 mandated that: 
[N]o school board . . . shall directly or indirectly require any student 
to attend any school other than the school which is geographically 
nearest or next nearest the student’s place of residence . . . and 
which offers the course of study pursued by such student.155 
Due to the numerous exceptions that Initiative 350 permitted under 
the broad prohibition, the effect was to grant the school district 
substantial latitude in assigning students for any reason so long as it 
was not related to racial desegregation. Using the political process 
 
 150.  Id. at 390–91. 
 151.  The group who organized the ballot initiative designated themselves “Citizens for 
Voluntary Integration Committee (CIVIC.)” See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 
457, 461–62 (1982). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See The Seattle Open Housing Campaign, 1959-1968, SEATTLE MUNICIPAL ARCHIVES 
(Jan. 7, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-
document-libraries/the-seattle-open-housing-campaign (discussing housing segregation in 
Seattle); see also, Kate Davis, Housing Segregation in Seattle (2005), http://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
zanran_storage/evans.washington.edu/ContentPages/1832317.pdf; see also UNIVERSITY OF 
WASHINGTON, SEATTLE CIVIL RIGHTS AND LABOR HISTORY PROJECT, 
http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/segregated.htm. 
 154.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 460–61.  
 155.  Wash. Rev. Code § 28.A26.010 (1981). 
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theory, the Court held that the voter-initiated amendment, which 
distinguished between the types of decisions within the school board’s 
purview on a racial basis, violated the Equal Protection Clause.156 
Justice Kennedy’s attempt to distinguish Schuette and Seattle failed 
in several respects. Focusing on state involvement, Kennedy wrote, 
“[t]he Seattle Court . . . found that the State’s disapproval of the school 
board’s busing remedy was an aggravation of the very racial injury in 
which the State itself was complicit.”157 But just as the state in Schuette 
took a position in defense of the anti-affirmative action voter initiative, 
the state in Seattle acted in defense of the anti-busing voter-initiative. 
In terms of the effect, it is the same. Justice Kennedy’s de jure 
distinction is of no consequence because this was not an issue in Seattle 
or in Schuette. 158 In both instances the state acted counter to policies 
that many historically disfavored racial minorities deemed to be in their 
interest, as indicated by their state court challenges to the initiatives 
and in their federal court constitutional challenges. The school district’s 
busing policy was designed as a corrective to de facto not de jure 
segregation. This is a point that the Schuette Court concedes.159 There 
was no finding of state sanctioned segregation. The Seattle Court’s 
concern regarding the initiative’s impact on de facto segregation was 
made clear when it noted that with the adoption of Initiative 350, 
“[t]hose favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now 
must seek relief from the state legislature, or from the statewide 
electorate.”160 
Affirmative action policies, as the executive office, courts, Congress, 
and academic institutions originally conceptualized them, were aimed 
at addressing inequalities that historically disfavored racial minorities 
(e.g. African Americans, Native Americans, and Latino Americans) and 
females experience.161 Numerous scholars have documented benefits of 
the policies.162 Yet, as with any complex and challenging problem, it 
 
 156.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 487.  
 157.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (2014).  
 158.  See id. 
 159.  Id. at 1633. (relying upon an allegation made by the NAACP to argue that even though 
there was no finding of de jure segregation by the Seattle Court, de jure segregation existed). 
 160.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 475. 
 161.  See generally LEITER & LEITER, supra note 16 (providing a historical treatment of 
affirmative action policies).  
 162.  See CHRISTOPHER COTTON, BRENT R. HICKMAN & JOSEPH P. PRICE, AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AND HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED FIELD 
EXPERIMENT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20397) (2014), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w2039; see also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF 
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takes time to counter the damage of discrimination. Racial minorities 
continue to suffer inequities in education, employment, voting, and 
healthcare.163 Therefore, laws that dismantle affirmative action policies 
inflict, in the case of racial minorities, “injury by reason of race.”164 The 
vociferous expressions of minority dissent to Proposal 2 and other anti-
affirmative action measures lend support to this conclusion. Just 
because the Schuette Court chose to ignore the likely consequences of 
Michigan’s amendment and focus instead on another question (i.e. the 
question of who gets to decide) does not change the probability based 
upon impressive empirical data, that the numbers of African 
Americans and other underrepresented racial minorities at selective 
colleges and universities will decline.165 
Next, the Schuette Court pointed to historical context to assert that 
Seattle may be distinguished based upon the relatively noncontroversial 
nature of busing, from the perspective of the State, as compared to the 
controversy surrounding race-conscious admissions. The Court 
maintained that, the constitutional validity of the remedy of school 
busing wasn’t an issue presented by the parties or interrogated by the 
Court166 in Seattle, whereas affirmative action remains highly 
controversial. But the Court failed to give due attention to the fact that 
in Seattle, the ballot initiative was motivated by some individuals who 
questioned the appropriateness of the “remedy” of mandatory busing 
just as in Schuette, the ballot initiative was motivated by some 
individuals who questioned the “remedy” of incorporating race-
 
THE RIVER (2000); Eric Grodsky & Michal Kurlaender, Mismatch and the Paternalistic 
Justification for Selective College Admissions, SOC. OF EDUC. (May 2013), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0038040713500772 (countering Sander’s mismatch 
arguments); Jamal Watson, Study Says Affirmative Action Does Not Do a Disservice to Students, 
in DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. (July 1, 2013), http://diverseeducation.com/article/54320/#. 
 163.  See Neil Irwin, Claire Cain Miller & Margot Sanger-Katz, America’s Racial Divide, 
Charted, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1paArKg; see also KOKCHHAR & FRY, supra 
note 112.  
 164.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014). 
 165.  See Danny Yagan, Affirmative Action Bans and Black Admissions Outcomes: Selection-
Corrected Estimates from UC Law Schools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
20361, 2014); see also Ford Fessenden & Josh Keller, How Minorities Have Fared in States with 
Affirmative Action Bans, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 24, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/24/us/affirmative-action-bans.html?_r=0 (stating 
that “[a] ban on affirmative action could lead to fewer minority admissions, as it has in some states 
that have already outlawed it”). 
 166.  The Schuette Court concludes, “[W]e must understand Seattle as Seattle understood 
itself, as a case in which neither the State nor the United States ‘challenge[d] the propriety of 
race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieving integration, even absent a finding 
of prior de jure segregation.’” See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633 (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472 n.15 (1982)).  
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conscious elements into public college admissions decisions. Further, 
the Schuette Court’s analysis ignores the fact that it already thoroughly 
scrutinized and affirmed the legal and constitutional soundness of 
academic institutions incorporating race-conscious factors into their 
decisions in a holistic way in pursuit of diversity.167 Just as there were 
dissenters to school busing in Seattle who registered their objections to 
that remedy through the voter initiative, there were dissenters who 
relied upon and voted for Proposal 2 in Michigan to register their 
objections to affirmative action. The Schuette Court should have 
accepted the “legitimacy and constitutionality of the remedy” (i.e. 
affirmative action policies) targeted by the voter initiative because it 
had previously decided this matter.168 This approach would be in 
keeping with the State’s position that it was not asking the Court to 
revisit the Grutter holding169 and with the Court’s representations that 
its decision did not involve overruling Grutter.170 
Another basis upon which the Schuette Court sought to distinguish 
Seattle was the matter of racial classification. The Court’s attention to 
this issue was necessary for two reasons. First, if the Court concluded 
that Michigan’s law had a “racial focus” such that it “target[s] a policy 
or program that ‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority,’”171 this 
would satisfy an essential element of the political process doctrine.172 
Second, if Michigan’s amendment could be viewed as drawing upon the 
concept of race to treat individuals differently, the Court would be 
compelled to apply strict scrutiny in its evaluation of the law’s 
constitutionality.173 
A determination that race was involved in the operation of 
Michigan’s law would have been favorable to BAMN. What the Court 
did, instead, was express resistance to the notion of racial classifications 
altogether. It maintained that in order to make the necessary 
determinations regarding the effect of Michigan’s law, it would be 
 
 167.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 168.  See id. 
 169.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623. 
 170.  Id. at 1630 (stating the case “is not about the constitutionality, or merits, of race-
conscious admissions policies in higher education . . . the Court [has] not disturb[ed] the principle 
that the consideration of race in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are 
met.”). 
 171.  BAMN, 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 472; 
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).  
 172.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 474. 
 173.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
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tasked with the unpleasant duty of having to racially classify people174 
and to assess whether certain challenged policies were for the benefit 
of particular racial minorities.175 The Schuette Court rejected Seattle’s 
approach, reasoning that it would require judges to engage in the 
loathsome practice of racial stereotyping.176 Because there were no 
clear legal standards to assist in this endeavor, the Court maintained 
that it could not conclude that the challenged legal measure implicated 
race in a constitutionally impermissible manner.177 
The Schuette Court’s racial stereotyping argument is not grounded 
in sound reasoning. Political process theory does not require the 
judiciary to classify individuals by race. It does, however, require the 
courts to acknowledge that there are racial and ethnic identities that 
individuals and groups have historically asserted and continue to do so, 
and that American society acknowledges those identities. Race is 
complex. The meaning of race and racial identities are sites of ongoing 
contestation. Even though racial classifications are socially constructed 
categories,178 they are social constructions that are infused throughout 
American discourse and diurnal life. American society is already 
racialized.179 It will take more than the Court’s refusal to recognize the 
classifications to unravel this complicated social structuring of 
existence. 
The Seattle Court concluded, in deciding whether Washington’s 
voter initiative had a racial component to it, “it is enough that 
 
 174.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. (“It cannot be entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals of the same 
race think alike. Yet that proposition would be a necessary beginning point were the Seattle 
formulation to control.”).  
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Ian Haney Lopez offers a rich and complex definition of race: 
[A]s a vast group of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially 
significant elements of their morphology and/or ancestry. I argue that race must be 
understood as a sui generis social phenomenon in which contested systems of meaning 
serve as the connections between physical features, races, and personal characteristics. 
In other words, social meanings connect our faces to our souls. Race is neither an 
essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process 
subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily 
decisions. As used in this Article, the referents of terms like Black, White, Asian, and 
Latino are social groups, not genetically distinct branches of humankind 
Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, 29 HARV. C.R. –C.L. LAW REV. 6, 7 (1994).  
 179.  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “racialization” as: “the act or process of 
imbuing a person with a consciousness of race distinctions or of giving a racial character to 
something or making it serve racial ends.” Racialization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED 
DICTIONARY (2016), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/racialization. 
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minorities may consider [the challenged law or practice] to be 
‘legislation that is in their interest.’”180 In response to both questions 
concerning the identity of the racial groups targeted and the immediate 
intended beneficiaries, courts will have the benefit of the self-
declarations of the litigants. Furthermore, regarding the latter inquiry, 
courts have the benefit of the legislative history of the laws, empirical 
data documenting how various racial groups perceive the legal measure 
under scrutiny, and the arguments asserted by the groups. The concept 
of “inur[ing] primarily to the benefit of the minority” is built into 
affirmative action policies.181 Regardless of how racial minorities would 
vote on an anti-affirmative action measure, it suffices that a challenge 
to the measure is raised asserting that the political power of some racial 
minorities is substantially impaired. If courts fail to thoroughly examine 
this claim, they, in effect, are denying the group any proper relief. The 
group’s representation within the democracy is diminished. The 
Schuette Court’s rejection of the racial focus element of the political 
process doctrine is tantamount to telling the BAMN plaintiffs, it does 
not matter that you say you are African Americans, Latinos, and Native 
Americans claiming that admissions policies which allow for 
considerations of race under restricted circumstances operate in your 
benefit. Because the Court cannot make that determination and has no 
legal standards for doing so, your argument has no merit.182 That 
position strips racial minorities who are attempting to challenge a 
measure that they deem counter to their political and legal interests of 
their voices. Lani Guinier invites public institutions to practice racial 
literacy. 183 Courts also need to adopt this practice of being cognizant of 
 
 180.  Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982) (quoting Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 181.  The National Conference of State Legislatures defines “affirmative action” as:  
In institutions of higher education, affirmative action refers to admission policies that 
provide equal access to education for those groups that have been historically excluded 
or underrepresented, such as women and minorities. 
See Affirmative Action: Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 7, 2014) 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-overview.aspx. 
 182.  This conclusion is supported by the Schuette Court’s reasoning: 
[T]he court would next be required to determine the policy realms in which certain 
groups—groups defined by race—have a political interest. That undertaking, again 
without guidance from any accepted legal standard, would risk, in turn, the creation  of 
incentives for those who support or oppose certain policies to cast the debate in terms 
of racial advantage or disadvantage. There would be no apparent limiting standards. 
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1635. 
 183.  Guinier explains: 
A racially literate institution uses race as a diagnostic device, an analytic tool, and an 
instrument of process. As a diagnostic or evidentiary device, race helps identify the 
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America’s racial history and the ways in which race pervades 
institutions and practices. Adjudicating cases from that perspective will 
ensure that courts appropriately interrogate legal measures that have 
the appearance of formal equality but the effect of unequal treatment 
corresponding to race. 
Following Seattle’s guidance, the Schuette Court could have 
determined that Michigan’s amendment implicated race by considering 
the law’s language, genesis, and operation. Even though Seattle’s 
Initiative 350 did not expressly mention race or the policy of 
desegregation,184 the Court in Seattle determined that there was 
evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the initiative was 
a response to the school district’s plan to racially integrate schools by 
assigning children to various schools and busing them to designated 
locations.185 Just as the Seattle Court looked to those factors, the 
Schuette Court could have done the same to conclude that Proposal 2 
directly targeted race in that it was an anti-affirmative action measure. 
A finding that the challenged amendment draws upon race is even 
more supported in Schuette when one compares the language of both 
legal measures. Michigan’s Proposal 2 used the word “race” whereas 
Seattle’s Initiative did not. Nonetheless, the Seattle Court determined 
that the conclusion regarding the initiative’s racial focus was warranted. 
The Court reasoned that where “the political process or the 
decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially conscious 
legislation – and only such legislation – is singled out for peculiar and 
disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly ‘rests on 
distinctions based on race.’”186 
Given that Schuette misapplied Reitman and failed to distinguish 
Hunter and Seattle, the Court should have applied the political process 
doctrine. Upon determining that Michigan’s amendment had a racial 
 
underlying problems affecting higher education. Racial literacy begins by defining race 
as a structural problem rather than a purely individual one. Race reveals the ways in 
which demography is often destiny — not just for people of color, but for working-class 
and poor whites as well. Race constantly influences access to public resources, while 
also revealing the influence of class and geographical variables. Racial literacy, 
therefore, continuously links the underrepresentation of blacks and Latinos to the 
underrepresentation of poor people generally. At a minimum, it reminds public 
institutions of higher learning that ‘the idea of access is deeply embedded in [their] 
genetic code’ and thus, the underrepresentation of certain demographic groups 
illuminates their failure to fulfill their public responsibilities. 
Guinier, supra note 30, at 201–02 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 184.  See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 489; see Wash. Rev. Code § 28.A26.010 (1981). 
 185.  See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 485–87.  
 186.  Id. at 485 (citations omitted).  
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focus because it targeted affirmative action and that the amendment 
levied a special burden on certain minorities by removing race-
conscious school policy decisions from the province of the board of 
trustees to a “new and remote level of government,”187 the Court 
should have evaluated the constitutional soundness of the amendment 
in terms of strict scrutiny pursuant to the requirements of the political 
process doctrine and Equal Protection Clause precedent.188 
3.  Strategic Maneuvers of the Court to Neutralize the Application 
of Disparate Impact Theory to Racial Inequalities in Education 
The Schuette decision can be explained in part by the Court’s 
recognition of the strategic importance of the political process doctrine 
and the doctrine’s reliance, at times, on disparate impact theory.189 The 
theory incorporates the disparate impact concept in that the inquiry 
does not stop at confirming whether formal equality has been achieved. 
Instead, it allows for the examination of the effect of the challenged 
legal provision on discrete and insular groups to assess whether it 
satisfies the Equal Protection Clause. Ely conceptualized judicial 
review of laws from a political process perspective as allowing the 
judiciary to draw “inference[s] of unconstitutional motivation” based 
upon “pattern of impact.”190 From Ely’s perspective, courts may 
invalidate laws even when those laws formally require that individuals 
be treated equally.191 
For example, in Hunter, the Court concluded that even though the 
amendment at issue was facially neutral, it nonetheless functioned to 
distinguish individuals on the basis of race, separating “those groups 
who sought the law’s protection against racial, religious, or ancestral 
discriminations in the sale and rental of real estate and those who 
sought to regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other 
ends.”192 The Schuette Court recognized this relationship between the 
political process framework and disparate impact theory.193 For this 
 
 187.  Id. at 483. 
 188.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).  
 189.  Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1625 (2014). (conceding 
that Proposal 2 would not survive the doctrine).  
 190.  ELY, supra note 6, at 139.  
 191.  Ely concludes that the formal neutrality of the law is insufficient to shield it from judicial 
invalidation. See generally ELY, supra note 6, at 135–79. 
 192.  Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 (1969).  
 193.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1627, 1630–38. 
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reason, it tried to dilute the doctrine, first by suggesting that there is a 
discriminatory intent requirement attached to it194 and second by 
suggesting that the cases that gave rise to the doctrine should be 
overturned or not extended further.195 Contrary, to the intimation of 
the Schuette Court, the political process doctrine does not have a 
requisite discriminatory intent element. As Seattle made clear, “[w]e 
have not insisted on a particularized inquiry into motivation in all equal 
protection cases.”196 Therefore, establishing that the motivations 
prompting the adoption of the challenged law are of an invidious racial 
nature is not a prerequisite for a successful equal protection challenge 
by means of the political process theory.197 
4.  Justice Kennedy’s New Replacement Standard for 
Strict Scrutiny 
Julian Eule highlights Article VI as the source of the obligation of 
all government actors to operate in a manner that conforms with and 
sustains the United States Constitution.198 The obligation imposes 
principled limitations on lawmakers and interpreters of this 
foundational document. As Eule persuasively argues, a comparable 
restraining element is absent in the case of the electorate.199 This makes 
the Schuette Court’s conclusion all the more troubling.200 Instead of 
applying strict scrutiny, the Schuette Court adopted a deferential 
posture. In essence, the Court applied a rational basis standard.201 
Justice Kennedy, however, made a statement that invites the query of 
 
 194.  Id. at 1625, 1629 –38. 
 195.  Id. at 1635–36.  
 196.  Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484–85 (1982). 
 197.  In support of this conclusion, the Seattle Court quoted Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, stating that “[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, 
is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Id. at 485 
(quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).  
 198.  Eule, supra note 7 at 1536. Article VI provides in relevant part: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 199.  Eule, supra note 7, at 1537 (“Article VI imposes the obligations of constitutional 
compliance on public officers, not the electorate.”). 
 200.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638.  
 201.  The Court does not expressly state the standard according to which it evaluated 
Michigan’s amendment. See id. However, its deferential posture towards the amendment, which 
is evident throughout the decision, and its conclusion that there is no legal authority that would 
permit it to invalidate the law, suggest that it applied a rational basis standard. See id. 
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whether the Court adopted a new standard of judicial review where 
racial minorities who bring equal protection challenges are concerned. 
His words lend support to Reva Siegel’s claim that there is a disturbing 
division in the way that the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection 
Clause, since Brown v. Board of Education, to extend extraordinary 
protection to the rights of the majority population and limited 
protection to “discrete and insular” racial minorities.202 Justice 
Kennedy opines that, “It is demeaning to the democratic process to 
presume that the voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this 
sensitivity on decent and rational grounds.”203 
If one may read “decent and rational” grounds as the replacement 
standard for strict scrutiny when laws that threaten the constitutional 
protections and guarantees of racial minorities are challenged, it is ill 
formed and fails to assure any protection whatsoever. In applying this 
lenient standard, the Court failed to fulfill its role of engaging in 
“representation-reinforcing . . . judicial review.”204 One can read 
Kennedy’s words as stating, if a majority of voters decide that racial 
minorities are not entitled to participate equally in the political process 
that determine matters which profoundly shape such minorities’ lives, 
that is constitutionally permissible. Yet, such an outcome clearly 
contravenes the equal protection and political participation principles 
established in the Constitution and certain statutes.205 
5.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s Receptiveness to the Political 
Process Doctrine in Other Contexts 
In other contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has been receptive to 
political process arguments. Romer v. Evans206 offers a revealing 
glimpse into the Court’s view of voter initiatives that infringe upon the 
equal protection rights of other groups besides those which are racially 
constructed207 and it sheds light on what the Court deems to constitute 
 
 202.  Siegel, supra note 13.  
 203.  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1637 (emphasis added). 
 204.  ELY, supra note 6, at 87. 
 205.  The Colorado Supreme Court drew a similar conclusion: 
[T]he facts remain that ‘[o]ne’s right to life, liberty, and property . . . and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcomes of no 
elections,’ West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1185, 
87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), and that ‘[a] citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be infringed 
simply because a majority of people choose that it be.’ Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. 
Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736, 84 S. Ct. 1459, 1474, 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964). 
See Evans v. Romer (Evans I), 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). 
 206.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 207.  Referencing numerous Colorado codes, the Romer Court identifies the protected class 
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animus. Romer involved a voter-initiated amendment to Colorado’s 
constitution.208 According to Colorado’s initiative process, in order to 
qualify a proposal for presentation to the general electorate, 
proponents must obtain “signatures by registered electors in an amount 
equal to at least five percent of the total number of votes cast for all 
candidates of the office of secretary of state at the previous general 
election.”209 Colorado voters and others drafted an amendment to their 
state constitution, known as Amendment 2,210 in response to a series of 
municipal and state laws enacted prohibiting discrimination on several 
bases, including sexual orientation.211 After obtaining the required 
number of signatures, the secretary of state placed the amendment on 
the ballot for consideration by Colorado’s voters. Amendment 2 
“passed by a margin of 813,966 to 710,151 (53.4% to 46.6%).”212 
Several groups challenged Amendment 2 alleging that it hindered 
their ability to participate equally in the political process thereby 
impermissibly burdening their right to equal protection.213 The 
Colorado Supreme Court in Evans I, relying upon Hunter, concluded 
that, “Hunter applies to a broad spectrum of discriminatory 
legislation”214 not just racially-focused legislation that is discriminatory. 
The court further reasoned that, where an “identifiable group” is 
uniquely burdened in its ability to participate equally in the political 
process, the political process doctrine governs, and strict scrutiny of the 
challenged legal measure is warranted.215 Relying upon that approach, 
 
as “homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.” Id. at 624.  
 208.  Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1272. 
 209.  COLO. CONST. art. V §1 para. 2.  
 210.  Colorado Amendment 2 provides: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither 
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its 
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or 
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby  homosexual, lesbian or 
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be 
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, 
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the 
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing. 
COLO. CONST. amend. II. 
 211.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 629 (noting Colorado’s implementation of a variety of ordinances 
and statutes that “set forth an extensive catalog of traits which cannot be the basis for 
discrimination, including age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a 
minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability of an individual or of his or her 
associates – and, in recent times, sexual orientation”).  
 212.  Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1272. 
 213.  Id. at 1273. 
 214.  Id. at 1282.  
 215.  Id. at 1276. 
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the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s issuance of a 
preliminary injunction staying the enforcement of Amendment 2.216 
The case came before the state supreme court again in Evans II, at 
which time that court affirmed that strict scrutiny was the appropriate 
standard of judicial review217 and upheld the lower court’s grant of a 
permanent injunction precluding the enforcement of Amendment 2 
because of the government’s failure to satisfy the requirements of strict 
scrutiny.218 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the state 
supreme court’s holding under different rationales.219 
Timing,220 the concept of neutrality,221 the scope of Amendment 2 
extending beyond the “private sphere”222 requiring application to 
“general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in 
governmental and private settings,”223 and the singular focus of the 
amendment on persons of “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual 
orientation” signaling animus224 are all rationales that the Court offered 
for its decision. The difference in justifications complicated Romer’s 
use as a valuable precedent for BAMN but it by no means disqualified 
it. Notably, the Court’s reasoning with respect to the singular focus of 
the challenged law trained on a specific class and the different process 
the law subjected that class to if its members wished to restore the 
measures designed to ensure their equality evinces the influence of 
political process theory.225 If the Court had considered similar factors 
 
 216.  Id. at 1286 (“Because the defendants and their amici have not proffered any compelling 
state interest to justify their enactment of Amendment 2 at this stage of the proceedings as 
required under the strict scrutiny standard of review [], we conclude that plaintiff’s have met their 
burden.”) (citations omitted).  
 217.  Evans v. Romer (Evans II), 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 (Colo. 1994) (“We reaffirm our holding 
that the constitutionality of Amendment 2 must be determined with reference to the strict scrutiny 
standard of review.”).  
 218.  Id. at 1350.  
 219.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–36 (1996). Although the Court did not explicitly 
reference political process theory, Romer is relevant to political process theory precedent because 
the Court relied upon aspects of the theory to reach its holding. See id.  
 220.  Id. at 623–24. 
 221.  Id. at 623. 
 222.  Id. at 629. 
 223.  Id. at 630. 
 224.  Id. at 624.  
 225.  The Romer Court’s reliance upon the concepts of political process theory is particularly 
evident in two places in the decision. The Court noted that “[t]he amendment withdraws from 
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, 
and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.” Id. at 627. In another place, the Court 
concludes that as a result of Amendment 2, “[h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that 
others enjoy or may seek without restraint. They can obtain specific protection against 
discrimination only be enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution or 
perhaps, on the State’s view, by trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability.” Id. at 631. 
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in Schuette, the result would have been the invalidation of Proposal 2. 
Just as the timing of Colorado’s Amendment closely followed the 
passage of local and state laws prohibiting discrimination based upon 
sexual orientation, Proposal 2 was an immediate response to Grutter. 
Colorado’s amendment impacted the quality of life for the LGBT 
community, in the areas of buying homes, shopping, securing 
employment, etc. So too, Michigan’s Proposal 2 has had widespread 
reverberating negative effects—not only for disfavored racial 
minorities, but also for society as a whole. This is because Proposal 2 
impacts equal access to education, which is essential to achieving the 
important societal goals of racial integration, having a well-educated 
polity, and having open pathways to assuming gainful employment and 
roles of leadership. Further, it forecloses avenues that were previously 
available to marginalized racial minorities to participate in the creation 
of educational policies that affect the quality of education available to 
them. Upholding Proposal 2 does not result in a neutral application of 
the laws; it preserves the status quo of racial inequality. 
The Romer Court focused on the way that Amendment 2 operated 
to single out individuals based upon their sexual orientation. 
Specifically, the Court noted that the amendment “identifies persons 
by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board.”226 
The Court also found credible the arguments asserting that 
Amendment 2 was motivated by animus towards the LGBT 
community.227 Because its origins were grounded in animus, the Court 
held that no legitimate interest could be stated for it.228 Regarding its 
conclusions that animus motivated the passage of Amendment 2, the 
Court considered both the singling out nature of the measure and the 
timing of placing the proposal on the ballot.229 
As a preliminary matter, demonstrating that animus motivated the 
contested law is not a requirement necessary to assess the 
constitutional validity of a measure under political process theory as it 
was initially conceived230 and applied in race-based equal protection 
 
 226.  Id. at 633–35. 
 227.  Id. at 632. 
 228.  The Court concluded the law must be held invalid because it was “born of animosity” 
and “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.” Id. at 634–35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 229.  Romer v. Evans, 512 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 230.  The Carolene Products footnote does not identify intentional discriminatory motivation 
as the predicate for judicial intervention. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 (1938). Instead, the emphasis was on the failings of the political system which can operate to 
repeatedly discount the political interests of discrete and insular minorities or bar them from 
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challenges.231 Accordingly, even if there is no evidence of the intention 
to discriminate on the basis of race, if the implementation of the legal 
measure results in unequal treatment in that respect, then strict scrutiny 
is required to assess whether it is legally justified. 232 In its future rulings 
on matters involving political process theory, the Court should not 
adopt an animus element. Introducing an intent standard divests the 
political process argument of its power and ensures that it will be 
difficult to invalidate voter initiatives that burden minority groups. 
In any event, just as the Court found animus to be at the root of 
Amendment 2, it could have found that it was present in the Schuette 
case. There are similarities between the motivations prompting the 
state and local governments of Colorado to implement 
antidiscrimination laws to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination 
and the reasons prompting the federal government and higher 
education academic institutions to adopt laws and policies designed to 
protect racial minorities and ensure equal treatment for them. The 
federal government recognized in adopting civil rights legislation that 
African Americans were experiencing racial discrimination in 
employment, education and other venues in which they needed 
protection.233 American universities and colleges designed affirmative 
action policies for a variety of reasons including expanding access to 
their institutions for underrepresented ethnic and racial groups.234 
Therefore, crafting legislation designed to eradicate such policies where 
there remain significant disparities in educational opportunities can be 
viewed as an intention to cause harm to those groups that immediately 
benefit from such measures. 
Writing for the majority in Romer, Justice Kennedy concluded that 
the effect of Amendment 2 was to prohibit the maintenance or future 
adoption of any laws designed to protect gay people from 
 
participating in the system altogether.  
 231.  Neither Hunter nor Seattle list racial animus as a requirement of the theory. See Hunter 
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 
(1982). Notably, racial focus is not the same as racial animus. Affirmative action policies designed 
to address racial inequalities may have a racial focus without being motivated by a malevolent 
purpose to inflict harm.  
 232.  As the Hunter Court reasoned regarding the charter amendment, “[A]lthough the law 
on its face treats Negro and white Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the 
law’s impact falls on the minority.” Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. 
 233.  See Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).  
 234.  See Caroline Keeler, The Evolution of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, in EDUC 
300: EDUCATION REFORM, PAST, AND PRESENT (May 3, 2013), http://commons.trincoll.edu 
/edreform/2013/05/the-evolution-of-affirmative-action-in-higher-education/; see also CHARLES 
DALE, FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY (2005).  
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discrimination, which bore no reasonable relationship to the 
government’s purported legitimate reasons. Romer demonstrates that 
the Court is capable of recognizing identifiable groups who assert their 
interests collectively235 and is capable of applying the concepts of 
political process theory, as necessary, to hold harmful disabling laws 
constitutionally invalid. The Court needs to adopt a similar posture in 
the future when evaluating anti-affirmative action ballot measures. 
II.  THE RISE OF THE VOTER INITIATIVE IN THE EDUCATION REALM 
AND THE ATTENUATING EFFECTS ON THE RIGHTS OF RACIAL 
MINORITIES 
Race-conscious legal measures, policies, and programs are 
undergoing a siege. The voter initiative is one popular means of attack; 
another vehicle is legislative action.236 Numerous states including, 
California, Michigan, Arizona, Washington, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, 
have relied upon direct democracy mechanisms to prohibit affirmative 
action.237 When Florida’s former Governor Jeb Bush led the charge 
against affirmative action with his One Florida executive order, 
minorities were effectively shut out of weighing in on the process 
because the governor implemented it “without inviting public 
comment.”238 
Derrick Bell, an early prognosticator of the dangers voter initiatives 
and referenda pose for racial minorities,239 concluded that such 
mechanisms “operate as a nonracial façade covering distinctly 
discriminatory measures.”240 Many of his insights have been borne out 
in the cycle of actions concerning matters of inequality and 
 
 235.  Romer v. Evans, 512 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 236.  In New Hampshire, for example, the legislature enacted a law prohibiting affirmative 
action in public employment and education. See New Hampshire, Chapter 227, HB 623, (2011 
Session). See Peter Schmidt, New Hampshire Ends Affirmative Action Preferences at Colleges, 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Jan. 4, 2012), https://chronicle.com/article/New-
Hampshire-Ends/130196/. 
 237.  For a list of states that have relied upon ballot initiatives to challenge affirmative action, 
see Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx. In 1998 Washington 
state adopted a voter-initiated ban on affirmative action, followed by Michigan in 2006, Nebraska 
in 2008, Arizona in 2010, and Oklahoma in 2012. See id. 
 238.  See Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, 
February 4, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/04/us/jeb-bush-roils-florida-on-affirmative-
action.html.  
 239.  Bell, supra note 4.  
 240.  Id. at 23.  
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education.241 This defeating cycle begins with the well-intentioned race-
conscious admissions policies designed to address inequalities and 
achieve ethnically and racially diverse student populations.242 The cycle 
progresses to the lawsuits challenging the policies.243 The lawsuits are 
often framed in terms of the Equal Protection Clause.244 The cycle 
continues on through Supreme Court decisions, which either uphold 
the school’s race-conscious policy but place severe restrictions on its 
use,245 or strike the policy down.246 If the Court upholds the policy, the 
next stage is the voter initiative that becomes a state law prohibiting 
affirmative action.247 In some instances, following the enactment of a 
state law, there is a later stage involving opponents of the state ban who 
challenge its constitutionality.248 The grim outcome of the cycle is that 
affirmative action is in danger of being eradicated as an option to 
address racial inequalities in education even though its objectives are 
far from complete. 
Ballot initiatives present a particularly vexing challenge for civil 
rights advocates who seek to accomplish integrationist, education 
 
 241.  Id. at 11–12. 
 242.  Id. at 6. 
 243.  Id. at 7. 
 244.  See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 249–50 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 
(Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2205 
(2016).  
 245. See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (remanding the case to the Fifth Circuit for the application 
of strict scrutiny to the University of Texas’ admissions policies); Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (upholding 
the use of race in admissions decisions but only as one of numerous “plus factors” that may be 
considered in evaluating candidates); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (upholding Texas’ narrowly 
tailored incorporation of race as a factor in its admissions decisions but placing severe limits on 
when race can be considered). Because the jurisprudence is locked within a cycle, even the Court’s 
holding in Fisher II, which is a positive outcome for affirmative action, provides insufficient 
protection for race-conscious policies because the next step in the process for Texas may be an 
anti-affirmative action ballot initiative. See id. 
 246.  See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275–76 (striking down Michigan’s undergraduate race-conscious 
admissions policy); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (holding the school’s race-sensitive admissions policies 
constitutionally-invalid).  
 247.  See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a). The anti-affirmative action Proposition 209 “passed by 
a margin of 54 to 46 percent . . . . [N]early 9 million Californians cast[] ballots, 4,736,180 voted in 
favor of the initiative and 3,986,196 voted against it.” Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 
692, 697 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit upheld the amendment in the Wilson case. Id. Several 
years later, in an applied challenge, the Ninth Circuit held that the equal protection claim was 
precluded by the court’s previous 1997 ruling. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128 
(9th Cir. 2012) 
 248.  The Wilson, Brown, and Schuette cases are examples of challenges to anti-affirmative 
action legal measures. See Wilson, 122 F.3d 692; Brown, 674 F.3d 1128; Schuette v. Coal. to 
Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
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access, and diversity goals,249 in part, through affirmative action. 
Empirical evidence suggests that when the majority white population 
is presented with ballot initiatives that are deemed counter to the 
interests of certain disfavored minority groups, they are likely to vote 
in favor of adopting them.250 Todd Donovan posits that whereas ballot 
initiatives that pertain to the populace at large (e.g. proposed laws on 
taxes) are likely to be voted upon based upon perceived economic 
interest. He states, “[r]eferendums on minority rights have the capacity 
to be largely about approving or disapproving members of a minority 
group[] . . . Indeed, awareness of which group is affected by a policy 
may itself be a heuristic that voters use when deciding on a 
proposal[].”251 Racial minority groups who have experienced 
oppression and disenfranchisement within American society are 
unlikely to fare well when issues that are perceived to be in their 
interest are turned over to a plebiscite.252 Where the issue is deemed to 
be detrimental to them, however, it is likely to pass by a majority vote.253 
There are other reasons to be concerned about direct democracy. 
The characteristics of voter initiatives make them inimical to 
constitutional freedoms and guarantees. The contemporary “initiative 
process . . . lacks some of the critical elements of the representative 
system of government, including debate, deliberation, flexibility, 
 
 249.  In her majority opinion for Grutter, Justice O’Connor enumerates a number of positives 
associated with diversity (including racial diversity) that make it a compelling interest such as, 
“promot[ing] learning outcomes,” “‘prepar[ing] students for an increasingly diverse workforce,’” 
facilitating the “military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security,” and 
achieving the nation’s civic objectives.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31 (citing various amici briefs). 
O’Connor further writes that, “[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups 
in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized. 
Id. at 330–32. 
 250.  See, e.g., Barbara Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245 (1997); 
Eule, supra note 7; Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1745 (2013) (“In sum, previous election results suggest that voters have not 
been sympathetic to minority rights and interests when questions affecting those issues were 
placed on the ballot.”); David Magleby, Direct Legislation in the American States, in 
REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (David 
Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1994) 
 251.  Donovan, supra note 250, at 1735 (citations omitted). 
 252.  Donovan claims that “[d]ecision making on issues that affect a clearly identifiable group, 
moreover, may be structured by positive or negative affect for the group.” Donovan, supra note 
250, at 1737 (citation omitted). 
 253.  See Donovan, supra note 250, at 1778 (concluding that “[m]inority rights and popular 
opinion are often in conflict in democratic political systems.”). See also John C. Brittain, Direct 
Democracy by the Majority Can Jeopardize the Civil Rights of Minority or Other Powerless 
Groups, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. REV. 144 (1996) (reviewing scholarship and cases supporting 
his argument that direct democracy harms the rights of minorities); Magleby, supra note 250.  
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compromise and transparency.”254 Further, voter initiatives are 
susceptible to manipulation by special interest groups.255 The events 
surrounding Proposal 2, as discussed in the following section, clearly 
illustrate this point. The harm not only affects marginalized racial 
minorities, but also the Constitution and the goal of equal 
representation. Privileging direct democracy vehicles for matters 
concerning equal protection of the laws and voting rights undermines 
the principle of one person, one vote and the very notion of minority 
political representation.256 
The legislative framework is preferable and more egalitarian, with 
respect to politically disadvantaged racial minorities, than a voter-
initiative constitutional amendment process for several reasons.257  It 
adds a layer of protection to the constitutional rights being challenged. 
Legislatively adopting laws allows for an airing of the issues that will 
include advocates articulating minority interests, as identified by the 
advocates’ constituencies. Bruce Cain and Kenneth Miller posit that, 
when constitutional amendments and other laws are reviewed by 
elected officials in the legislature “[it] permits minorities to aggregate 
and leverage their strength; publicly recorded votes and electoral 
competition build accountability into the system and the mere presence 
 
 254.  See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52, at 4 (2002). Regarding transparency, 
proponents of the initiatives often do not heavily publicize them to make their passage easier. For 
example, in New Hampshire, State representative Gary Hopper who co-sponsored anti-
affirmative action legislation there, attributed its successful adoption to the limited press it 
received and the incorrect assumptions of its likely opponents that it would be rejected. In his 
interview with State Representative Hopper, Peter Schmidt reported: 
[Hopper] said he believes that supporters of affirmative action might have been lulled 
by the state’s defeat of similar measures in the past. When he first co-sponsored such a 
bill in 2000, he said, the legislature’s meeting rooms ‘were full of people fighting against 
it.’ This time around, he speculated, ‘people were caught off guard’ and ‘did not pay any 
attention’ because they assumed such a measure would fail. 
See Schmidt, supra note 236. 
 255.  Magleby, supra note 250.  
 256.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 564 (1964) (“[E]ach citizen has an inalienable right to 
full and effective participation in political processes of his state’s legislative bodies . . . full and 
effective participation . . . requires that each citizen has an equally effective voice in election of 
members of his state legislature.”). 
 257.  For a counter view, see scholarship questioning the efficacy of state legislatures in 
protecting the rights of racial minorities. For example, Matthew Streb argues that the legislative 
record on minority issues as compared to voter initiative outcomes needs to be meticulously 
studied before any conclusions can be drawn regarding which mechanism is more favorable and 
fairer to minorities. See MATTHEW J. STREB, RETHINKING AMERICAN ELECTORAL 
DEMOCRACY 66 (3d ed. 2016). Richard Briffault comments that “it is difficult to argue that 
historically minorities –in particular, blacks and other racial minorities—did all that well in state 
legislatures. Racial discrimination was largely a product of state legislative action, not initiative 
votes.” Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1364 (1985).  
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of minorities in the legislature may deter the worst forms of legislative 
prejudice.”258 Legislative debate also positions the issues for review by 
courts. Litigants may draw upon the legislative record, as they prepare 
their equal protection cases. In turn, this information can provide useful 
source material for judges to comprehend the history of the legislation, 
its objectives, and the costs and benefits to the political interests 
involved. 
In Schuette, those organizing the voter initiative relied upon the 
unfiltered amendment process. Even though some groups raised issues 
regarding the fairness and integrity of the process early on, none of the 
courts adequately addressed them. The Schuette Court developed a 
myopic vision of democracy when it placed its faith in a distorted 
process. When you permit state constitutional amendment through 
voter initiatives that ultimately impact on federal constitutional 
protections in place for racial minorities (and others), it potentially 
renders those protections ineffectual. This is true especially where 
courts adopt a deferential posture towards the amendments. The 
nuances, historical background, and intentions behind the Equal 
Protection Clause and race-conscious policies are not given due 
consideration by the larger populace. Failing to take these 
considerations into account can result in the invalidation of policies and 
programs geared towards achieving racial equality.259 
III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Breaking the Cycle 
The cycle that the fight for educational equality is enmeshed in can 
be broken by exposing the perils voter initiatives pose to a well-
functioning representative republican government, by limiting their 
use, by challenging the rhetoric that casts direct democracy as the 
ultimate fulfillment of egalitarian objectives, by holding courts 
accountable for fulfilling their constitutional duties, and by positing an 
alternative vision of participatory democracy that aims at substantive 
equality. This Article’s recommendations are developed in three parts. 
One part pertains specifically to courts and their responsibilities in 
 
 258.  Cain & Miller, supra note 3, at 50.  
 259.  In another article, Cain and Miller reach a similar conclusion, commenting that 
“[i]nitiative government leads to a higher level of policy responsiveness to the median statewide 
voters, but it produces biases against individual and minority rights—precisely what the checks 
and balances system was meant to protect.” Id. at 42. 
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reviewing direct democracy instruments that infringe upon 
constitutional rights. The second part refers to voter initiatives. The 
third part concerns the public officials and administrators charged with 
the formulation of school policies. 
1.  The Court’s Role in Achieving Substantive Equality in 
Education and the Participation of Racial Minorities in Public Policy 
Decisionmaking 
Courts have an instrumental role to play in achieving substantive 
equality in education and in voting. The American legal regime permits 
individuals to craft initiatives on a wide range of issues that implicate 
federal constitutional principles and guarantees,260 but when those 
issues pertain to racial equality, the Court must treat them with 
circumspection, not deference. As Schuette demonstrates, voter 
initiatives can be structured and wielded in ways that limit the ability 
of marginalized racial minorities to fully participate in the democratic 
process and that effectively deny them political representation. If left 
unchecked, such mechanisms have the potential to undermine the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Constitution and statutory laws 
regarding equality principles. The Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 
emphasized that, “a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands 
judicial protection; our oath and our office require no less of us.”261 An 
informed judiciary that is versed in the Constitution and relevant state 
constitutions will render better decisions and engage in the proper 
balancing analysis as compared to the electorate.  The arguments that 
litigants present to the court will be framed in terms of constitutional 
principles and other legal sources. By way of written opinion, courts will 
offer their reasoning in those terms or by reference to precedent. The 
exercise of judicial reasoning within this framework of legal doctrines, 
laws, and constitutional principles provides for a more thorough 
consideration of contested laws than voters who must decide on an 
initiative. 
When confronted with a voter initiative, like Proposal 2, that seeks 
to undo Supreme Court precedent within a particular state, precedent 
should prevail because of the federal constitutional interests at stake. 
As the Court’s recognized in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, “[w]hen a State 
exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is 
insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried 
 
 260.  See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52. 
 261.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).  
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over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a 
federally protected right.”262 The right at stake is the ability of racial 
minorities to engage in meaningful political participation without being 
subjected to disenfranchising barriers that assume the shape of formal 
equality. 
While it is important not to rely solely on courts for solutions, courts 
are an integral part of ensuring that representative government 
functions effectively for all. Exacting judicial review supported by state 
laws is necessary to strike down initiatives that have a disenfranchising 
effect or that are tainted by fraud.263 Courts are particularly important 
where there are no designated local or state agencies in place to 
counter the possibility that individual constitutional rights did not get 
fair and due consideration. 
The Schuette case highlights the significance of the political process 
argument as a tool to ensure the equal representation of disfavored 
minority political interests. The plurality’s decision was seriously 
deficient in its treatment of this theory and left unresolved many 
questions regarding: the standard of judicial review when racial 
classifications are involved, federalism and the Court’s precedents and 
authority relative to state powers, and the political process doctrine. 264 
While the Court may be resistant to this theory in part because it entails 
disparate impact analysis, accomplishing substantive equality requires 
an examination of the effects of laws rather than merely looking to how 
they are facially characterized.265 It is necessary for the Court to affirm 
its power and authority to undertake the relevant analysis. Political 
process theory is an essential mechanism to counter majoritarian 
actions that subordinate the federal constitutional rights of racial 
minorities to the political will of the majority. For this reason, courts 
 
 262.  Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960); see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.  
 263.  This Article concurs with Derrick Bell regarding the level of judicial review necessary 
to furnish the requisite protection. Bell writes, “The evidence, both historical and contemporary, 
justifies a heightened scrutiny of ballot legislation similar to that recognized as appropriate when 
the normal legislative process carries potential harm to the rights of minority individuals.” Bell, 
supra note 4, at 23.  
 264.  See Mark Strasser, Schuette Electoral Process Guarantees and the New Neutrality, 94 
NEB. L. REV. 60 (2015) (discussing the confusion the Schuette opinion has caused in the areas of 
electoral processes, equal protection, and political process theory).  
 265.  Christopher Schmidt engages in a textual and historical analysis of the word “equal,” 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and equal protection jurisprudence to conclude that in order to 
properly apply the Equal Protection Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court must recognize disparate 
impact theory. See generally Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection 
Clause: Why the Definition of ‘Equal’ Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When Laws 
Unequally Affect Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85 (2002).  
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should be receptive to the argument if it is presented in future cases.266 
2.  Restricting and Reforming Voter Initiatives 
The next set of recommendations primarily pertains to voter 
initiatives. Direct democracy, without judicial review, is not the 
appropriate vehicle to decide matters concerning equal protection and 
voting rights guarantees.  Due to the patriotic, idealistic, and nostalgic 
sentiments of the electorate, revising voter initiatives may prove to be 
taxing.267 Nonetheless, reform is desperately needed. The empirical 
evidence identifying the costs they inflict on the stability and proper 
functioning of the political system should provide substantial fuel for 
any reform campaign. 268 Since it will be difficult to persuade states to 
reconfigure the parameters of ballot initiatives according to the 
recommendations herein, courts should be prepared to deter their use 
for the aforementioned purposes by invalidating them where it can be 
demonstrated that the burdens they place on federally protected rights 
are greater than the state interest advanced and any asserted interest 
in preserving direct democracy. 
Despite the challenging aspects of reforming voter initiatives, states 
should make an effort to do so, consulting the best practices and 
recommendations of the National Conference of State Legislatures 
Initiative and Referendum Task Force and other useful empirical 
studies.269 The Task Force makes thirty-four recommendations that 
address many deficiencies of direct democracy.270 The 
recommendations cover the areas of the role of the legislature, the 
substance of the initiative, the “drafting and certification phase,” “the 
signature gathering phase,” “voter education,” “financial disclosure,” 
and “voting on initiatives.”271 
As its beginning point, the Task Force counsels against 
implementing voter initiative procedures in states that do not presently 
provide for them because of the threats they pose to fair and 
meaningful representation of the citizenry and to constitutional 
 
 266.  For example, if Fisher II provokes activists to campaign for an anti-affirmative action 
ballot initiative and affirmative action proponents challenge it, the Court should at the very least, 
acknowledge that it possesses the power to decide the issues presented and proceed with the 
appropriate analysis.  
 267. See generally ROBERT ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN 
AMERICA 132 (2002).  
 268.  See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 52. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  See id. at ix–xii (summarizing the recommendations). 
 271.  Id. 
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freedoms. In making this recommendation, the Task Force notes that 
voter initiatives often operate without adequate safeguards to ensure 
against voter manipulation and fraud and, furthermore, allow political 
interest groups to bypass the protections built into the political 
structure (e.g. legislative debate and hearings).272 Although the Task 
Force proposes some sound strategies,273 notably the recommendation 
that states should not adopt a “constitutional amendment initiative 
process,”274 even with the proposed reforms, direct democracy poses 
significant risks to constitutional rights and exceptional risks for 
minorities that must be mitigated by judicial intervention. 
It is the duty of all states to make a conscientious effort to structure 
democracy so that it is representative of and responsive to the whole 
polity. One step in that direction is ensuring that the instruments of 
political participation are properly used and designed to accurately 
register rather than impede the political interests of discrete and insular 
minorities. The following suggestions are offered with those objectives 
in mind. 
States should place restrictions on the subject matter of voter 
initiatives to remove from their purview issues concerning fundamental 
federal constitutional guarantees. This is necessary given the 
substantial scholarship demonstrating that voters are either woefully 
uninformed of the implications of their votes, misled by the 
presentation of the issues, or acting out of negative stereotypes to the 
detriment of marginalized minorities.275 Further, states should restrict 
initiatives to being legislative proposals rather than permitting their use 
as direct vehicles for constitutional amendment. 
 
 
 272.  Id. at ix. 
 273.  It is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate all of the Task Force’s 
recommendations.  
 274.  Id. at ix. Bruce Cain and Roger Noll have also decried the shortcomings of the initiative 
constitutional amendment process as compared to the more deliberative process of constitution 
revision. See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State 
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1523 (2009). They note that the former is more 
destabilizing in that it is subject to manipulation by partisan groups seeking to constitutionally 
solidify their positions and it appeals to the emotions of voters rather than reasoned analysis 
whereas the latter has the advantage of a tiered process of ratification by voters and elected 
representatives. See id.  
 275.  See John C. Brittain, Direct Democracy by the Majority Can Jeopardize the Civil Rights 
of Minority or Other Powerless Groups, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. REV. 144 (1996). See also 
Donovan, supra note 84, at 1745; Bell, supra note 4; Eule, supra note 7, at 1545 (1990); TASK 
REPORT, supra note 52. 
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State governments should be required to have clear procedures for 
investigating complaints of voter fraud and deceptive practices 
associated with voter initiatives. The agencies charged with the task of 
investigation and enforcement should be identified and held 
accountable. Where an agency fails to appropriately fulfill its duty, the 
challenged initiative should not be certified. When substantial abuses 
of the system occur, like those leading to the certification of Proposal 
2, the petition should be invalidated and penalties imposed on those 
committing and orchestrating the fraud. Courts should act with the 
necessary speed to resolve an issue before it is presented to the 
electorate. Where timing is an issue, the court should issue an injunction 
even if this means that consideration of the matter by the electorate is 
delayed for several months. 
As the OKD case illustrates, not only can voter initiative review 
procedures be deficient at the early phases of signature gathering and 
certification, but also the process for constitutional amendment may be 
severely lacking in terms of the requirements for passage. For example, 
in many states, including Michigan, the ballot initiative only requires a 
simple majority.276 If states are resistant to restricting the subject matter 
of voter initiatives, at a minimum the correctives should include a 
supermajority requirement and legislative review and approval. 277 
3.  The Role of Governing Boards, Public School Officials and 
Administrators in the Decisionmaking Process 
Governing boards, public school officials, and administrators are 
integral to the decisionmaking that determines the content of the 
policies, such as whether to adopt legacy preferences,278 for public 
academic institutions. Boards also appoint university presidents, 
establish budgets, approve curriculum changes and university 
 
 276.  MICH. CONST. art. 12, § 2.  
 277.  In this respect, this Article agrees with numerous scholars, including Robert Ellis, who 
have written about the dangers of amending state constitutions through voter initiatives. Ellis 
considers the requirements that most states have in place to allow legislative changes to their 
constitutions in comparison to the requirements for constitutional amendment through voter 
initiatives. See ELLIS, supra note 267, at 124. He notes that while an amendment of the 
constitution by the legislature typically requires a supermajority, surprisingly, many states only 
require a simply majority to amend the state constitution via a voter initiative. Id. Ellis maintains 
that this difference in treatment is illogical. Id. If anything, it would make sense for the informed 
legislature to have more lenient requirements to accomplish a constitutional amendment. See id. 
at 127. Eule also posits that, “simple majorities cannot be expected consistently to honor the 
interests of minorities and guarantee individual liberties.” See Eule, supra note 7, at 1554.  
 278.  See Richard Kahlenberg, Elite Colleges, or Colleges for the Elite, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/opinion/30kahlenberg.html. 
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contracts.279 While their actions are also appropriately subject to 
judicial review, their positioning as entities that have extensive insight 
into the goals of institutions, the educational needs of their state, the 
demographics of their region, and the educational goals of society, 
mean that their decisionmaking power should not be so easily 
supplanted by the process of direct democracy. They are engaged in 
ongoing reflection on these matters in ways that differ from the larger 
electorate and courts. The decision to include race-conscious measures 
like affirmative action into admissions policies was the product of 
dialogue and consideration of the aforementioned factors.280 
Affirmative action in this context is geared towards educational 
enrichment and equality, and decisions about that, when race is 
involved, must be made by educational authorities with appropriate 
judicial oversight, not popular votes. Schuette demonstrates that the 
popular vote suppresses the voices of racial minorities, whereas 
decisions by the educators enhance those voices.281 
B.  Whether Formulating Arguments According to Yoshino’s Vision of 
“The New Equal Protection” Offers A Viable Alternative Strategy 
for Achieving the Equal Access of Racial Minorities to the 
Political Process in Public Universities  
Kenji Yoshino poses the provocative question of whether this 
moment in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court marks “the end of 
constitutional civil rights in this country.”282 He posits that the Court 
has turned its judicial frame away from equality-based arguments of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to liberty-based claims of the First 
Amendment.283 If his assessment is accurate, then groups, such as civil 
rights advocates, who traditionally relied upon equal protection 
arguments to achieve substantive gains need to find alternative 
 
 279.  See Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges Statement on Board 
Responsibility and Institutional Governance, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, 
https://www.suny.edu/media/suny/content-assets/documents/boardoftrustees/BOT-AGB-
governance.pdf. See also Public Trustees, OHIO HIGHER ED, https://www.ohiohighered.org/ 
trustees (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).  
 280.  Brief for Respondents Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ. and Irvin Reid at 9, 
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (No. 12-682). 
 281.  The background on how Proposal 2 came into being, as discussed in Part I of this Article, 
reveals that the initiative process worked against the clearly expressed interests of various racial 
minorities in maintaining race-conscious policies. See supra Part I. In contrast, the success of racial 
minorities in securing the inclusion of such policies within the decisionmaking of university 
admissions boards suggests their voices were heard. See supra Part I. 
 282.  Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 781–83 (2011).  
 283.  Id.  
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approaches to accomplish their objectives. As a way of compensating 
for the paradigm shift in thinking, Yoshino argues that the “liberty-
based dignity claim” may be a way to respond to the Court’s rejection 
of disparate impact claims.284 By moving the claim to what he describes 
as a “high enough level of generality” those who are not advancing it 
can nonetheless relate to it and envision themselves in terms of it.285 
But Yoshino’s proposition should include an important caveat. If 
the claim is too general, it will not fully explain the problem and 
account for why the claim is being made in the first instance. Yoshino 
maintains that the liberty-based dignity claim is likely to garner 
widespread support and to be accepted by the Court.286 Under his 
approach, this type of claim should be brought rather than one, for 
example, asserting that Proposal 2 constitutes direct discrimination in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Yoshino equates this “high 
level of generality” with universal human rights. 287 He predicts that the 
Court’s current analytical framework for addressing equal protection 
claims brought by minorities is likely to result in their failure. The 
Court’s posture towards arguments asserted by racial minorities in 
support of affirmative action bears out his thesis. Yoshino writes: 
[S]tate action that seeks to help historically disadvantaged groups – 
“affirmative action” programs – are the governmental programs 
most likely to remain facially discriminatory. . . . In contrast, state 
action that perpetuates the subordination of historically 
disadvantaged groups will tend to express itself in facially neutral 
terms. . . . For this reason equal  protection jurisprudence that turns 
formalistically on facial discrimination will, from an 
antisubordination perspective, get it exactly backward. On the one 
hand, this jurisprudence invalidates affirmative action programs 
seeking to aid historically subordinated groups. . . . On the other 
hand, it upholds second-generation discrimination that continues to 
subordinate groups.288 
If one takes Yoshino’s arguments to heart and attempts to make 
inroads relying upon liberties arguments, it is not clear that they would 
fare any better. BAMN already tried this strategy, albeit at the district 
court level, and it did not work.289 Drawing from cases like Grutter, 
 
 284.  Id.  
 285.  Id. at 794.  
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. at 767–68. 
 289.  The failure of this approach in Schuette is not a reason to abandon it. Rather, the goal 
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which contained aspects of the argument that universities have the 
freedom to make decisions about whom to admit and the substance of 
their curricula,290 BAMN argued that as “beneficiaries” of university 
policies that took into account diversity, Proposal 2 infringed upon their 
First Amendment right to academic freedom.291 The district court 
rejected this argument, concluding that BAMN lacked standing in that 
the First Amendment right belonged to the universities rather than to 
them.292 
The challenge to properly frame a cognizable liberty-style 
argument is evident. If courts are resistant to recognizing BAMN’s 
interests and the impact of a restrictive initiative, like Proposal 2, on the 
lived experiences of those represented, then regardless of how the 
argument is framed, courts will not act in a protective manner.293 While 
the academic freedom argument was persuasive in Grutter, it is not 
clear that even if the universities had been in a position to make this 
argument rather than the plaintiffs, that it would have changed the 
outcome of the case at the district court level or ultimately at the 
Supreme Court level.294 In fact, in a later moment in the litigation it is 
interesting that the Schuette Court articulated a liberty-based argument 
not in support of BAMN but rather as a rationale for its holding that 
the Court lacked the power to prohibit Michigan voters from deciding 
the question of the constitutional validity of race-conscious 
admissions.295 The question then for civil rights activists who seek to 
 
here is to underscore the difficulty in framing substitute civil rights arguments that will protect 
racial minority interests in being able to fully participate and contribute to society. 
 290.  See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 
924, 934–35, 942–43 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985); Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
 291.  Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 935. 
 292.  Id. at 943 (“[T]he Coalition plaintiffs do not have a personal right to a diverse student 
body grounded in the First Amendment.”) 
 293.  Reva Siegel persuasively argues that in the desegregation period, the United States 
Supreme Court has privileged the experience of “majority groups” protecting them “from actions 
of representative government that promote minority opportunities” while simultaneously 
disregarding the experiences “discrete and insular” racial minorities. Siegel, supra note 13, at 7. 
 294.  It is important to note that the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and 
Wayne State University were actually named as defendants in the case. They sought to be 
dismissed but the court refused their request concluding that they were “properly joined as 
parties.” See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 941. 
 295.  Justice Kennedy reasoned: 
The respondents in this case insist that a difficult question of public policy must be taken 
from the reach of the voters, and thus removed from the realm of public discussion, 
dialogue, and debate in an election campaign. Quite in addition to the serious First 
Amendment implications of that position with respect to any particular election, it is 
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have the promise of the reconstruction amendments fulfilled and to see 
the fruition of the work of their campaigns is: Can they repackage their 
objectives as liberty-based arguments? The challenge is a daunting one.  
CONCLUSION 
There are long-term implications to the Schuette decision that 
extend beyond the realm of education. The success of voter initiatives 
such as Proposal 2 result in unequal political processes that give a 
permanency to majoritarian political advantages. Ballot initiatives 
distort the democratic process and undermine equality principles. For 
these reasons, severe restrictions should be placed on them where they 
seek to override fundamental equal protection and voting rights 
constitutional guarantees involving racial minorities. It is critically 
important for courts to intervene in the wake of disabling majoritarian 
political action in order to achieve the “representation reinforcing 
approach to judicial review”296 that functions to facilitate the effective 
participation and representation of racial minorities in the political 
process. Finally, the political process doctrine should be available to 
racial minorities who seek to protect their right to fully participate in 
democracy and influence the decisions that impact them. 
 
 
inconsistent with the underlying premises of a responsible, functioning democracy. 
See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014) (emphasis 
added). Kennedy later writes, “First Amendment dynamics would be disserved if this Court were 
to say that the question here at issue is beyond the capacity of the voters to debate and then to 
determine.” Id.  
 296.  ELY, supra note 6, at 87.  
